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INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff, a whistleblower suing his former employer for im-
properly eliminating his position, requests all documents, notes, me-
moranda, e-mails, and metadata1 related to organizational restructur-
ing from the employer’s external hard drives.2  The defendant is a  
relatively poor rural county that moves for a protection order, arguing 
that the requests are overbroad and would cost the county approx-
imately $49,000 to produce, not including attorney review time.3  The 
plaintiff’s potential recovery in the case is estimated to be “significant-
ly less” than $100,000.4  How should a judge rule on the request? 
The explosion of costly electronic discovery in the mid-1990s 
made this type of problem commonplace for district and magistrate 
judges, who in turn began exercising their authority under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to allocate some expenses to the re-
questing parties.5  When a majority of the Supreme Court recently 
cited “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” discovery as a 
reason for its recognition of a heightened civil pleading standard in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,6 Justice Stevens retorted that Rule 26(c), 
among others, supplied a better tool for managing pretrial costs.7  
1 Metadata is defined as “evidence, typically stored electronically, that describes 
the characteristics, origins, usage and validity of other electronic evidence.”  CRAIG 
BALL, BEYOND DATA ABOUT DATA:  THE LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO METADATA 2 (2005), 
http://www.craigball.com/metadata.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other 
words, it is “data about data.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 This example is derived from Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577, 578 (W.D. 
Wis. 2007).  For further discussion of this case, see subsection III.B.3. 
3 246 F.R.D. at 578. 
4 Id. 
5 Rule 26(c)(1) provides that the “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order 
to protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or expense, including . . . specify-
ing terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(c)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendments 
(“[C]ourts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue 
burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering 
party pay costs.”). 
6 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007). 
7 Justice Stevens stated, 
The Court vastly underestimates a district court’s case-management arsen-
al. . . . Indeed, Rule 26(c) specifically permits a court to take actions “to pro-
tect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
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Providing an exception to the traditional discovery presumption that 
each party to a lawsuit bears its own discovery costs,8 Rule 26(c) per-
mits the district court to shift costs onto the party requesting discovery 
upon a finding of “good cause.”9  But what constitutes “good cause,” 
and how should a court determine the appropriate amount of cost 
shifting?  With little guidance from the Rules themselves10 or the 
courts of appeal,11 lower courts initially developed several analytical 
frameworks for analyzing the problem.  These approaches can be 
roughly grouped into four categories:  (1) the “marginal utility” test 
promulgated in McPeek v. Ashcroft,12 (2) the Rowe test,13 (3) the Zubu-
lake test,14 and, following the 2006 electronic discovery amendments to 
the Rules, (4) the application to cost shifting of seven factors outlined 
burden or expense” by, for example, disallowing a particular discovery re-
quest, setting appropriate terms and conditions, or limiting its scope.  
 In short, the Federal Rules contemplate that pretrial matters will be settled 
through a flexible process of give and take, of proffers, stipulations, and 
stonewalls, not by having trial judges screen allegations for their plausibility vel 
non without requiring an answer from the defendant. 
Id. at 593-94 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
8 As the Court stated in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,  
Under [discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must 
bear the expense of complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke the 
district court’s discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him 
from “undue burden or expense” in doing so, including orders conditioning 
discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the costs of discovery. 
437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
10 Although the Rules were amended in 2006 to address electronic discovery con-
cerns, they have not established a uniform analytical framework for addressing cost 
shifting.  See infra Part III. 
11 The highly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard governing appellate re-
view of cost-shifting discovery issues also precludes robust guidance from circuit courts.  
See, e.g., Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming 
without extensive discussion the district court’s expense-shifting order due to Rule 
26(c)’s grant of “considerable discretion in determining whether expense-shifting in 
discovery production is appropriate in a given case”); see also Alan F. Blakley, Unans-
wered Questions in the December 2006 Federal Rules Changes, FED. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 
39, 40 (noting the dearth of appellate authority regarding electronic discovery). 
12 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The more likely it is 
that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the 
fairer it is that the government agency search at its own expense.  The less likely it is, 
the more unjust it would be to make the agency search at its own expense.  The differ-
ence is ‘at the margin.’”). 
13 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (developing an eight-factor test discussed in subsection II.B.1). 
14 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (de-
veloping a hierarchical seven-factor test discussed in Section II.C). 
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in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26(b)(2), which were ac-
tually intended to guide the threshold question of whether certain 
discovery should be produced in the first place.15 
This Comment analyzes the benefits and disadvantages of each 
cost-shifting approach in the context of electronic discovery (e-
discovery).16  It examines civil cases in which the court considered or-
dering the requesting party to bear some or all of the expenses of the 
responding party’s technical search, restoration, and production of 
electronically stored information (ESI).17  The Comment’s scope is li-
mited to cost-shifting disputes between parties to a lawsuit.18  It also 
15 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments; see 
also infra subsection III.B.2. 
16 Electronic discovery involves electronically stored information, or ESI.  See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments (defining ESI broadly 
as any type of information stored in any electronic medium). 
17 Courts have typically refused to order reimbursement for parties to cover pre-
production attorney review time because these costs do not relate to the technical in-
accessibility of data (which justifies cost shifting) and because the producing party 
could strategically pass heavy costs onto its opponent by controlling which attorneys 
scrutinize the data and how thoroughly they do so.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
216 F.R.D. 280, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (opining that “the responding party should al-
ways bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has been con-
verted to an accessible form” for two main reasons:  (1) “the producing party has the 
exclusive ability to control the cost of reviewing the documents,” and (2) “cost-shifting 
is only appropriate for inaccessible . . . data”); Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432 (“[I]f any defen-
dant elects to conduct a full privilege review of its e-mails prior to production, it shall 
do so at its own expense.”).  But see Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 
F.R.D. 550, 562 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (ordering the requesting party to be responsible 
for the full cost of the producing party’s relevance and privilege review for one set of 
backup tapes and the full cost of the relevance review and half the cost of the privilege 
review for another set of backup tapes).  The Advisory Note to Rule 26(b)(2) cautions 
against shifting attorney review costs but counsels that “the producing party’s burdens 
in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege may weigh against permitting 
the requested discovery.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 
amendments.  At least one court has denied a motion to compel discovery by focusing 
on the burden presented by attorney review time.  In In re General Instrument Corp. Se-
curities Litigation, the court found 
that the requested documents could be retrieved from the backup tapes with-
out undue expense.  Nevertheless, the technical matter of retrieving the doc-
uments from the backup tapes would be just the start of the process.  Defense 
counsel would then have to read each e-mail, assess whether the e-mail was 
responsive, and then determine whether the e-mail contained privileged in-
formation.  Given that the volume of e-mail at issue here is potentially very 
large, the court finds that the burden of reviewing the requested documents 
would be heavy. 
No. 96-1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999). 
18 Courts are much more likely to shift costs away from subpoenaed nonparties.  
See, e.g., Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 313 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (stating 
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does not analyze cost-shifting orders meant to serve as a sanction for 
discovery violations. 
Part I explores how the rise of costly electronic discovery in the 
1990s led judges to consider cost shifting without developing robust 
analytical tests. 
Part II traces the development of multifactor tests as a more so-
phisticated tool to handle expensive discovery requests.  Although 
these tests were more systematic than the earlier approaches, they 
contained flaws.  The marginal utility test in practice largely ignored 
the economic costs of each particular production.19  The Rowe test 
employed a mechanical factor-counting approach that led to libera-
lized cost shifting in every reported case where it was applied.20  It also 
accompanied a plaintiff-friendly discovery protocol, which seemed to 
authorize intrusive “fishing expeditions” so long as they were financed 
by the requesting parties.21  The weighted-factor Zubulake test provided 
sound analytical underpinnings, but in practice it resulted in some-
what divergent decisions hinging on the least important factors.22 
Part III evaluates the 2006 amendments to Rule 26(b)(2), which 
provided a multifactor test for the production of inaccessible data that 
many courts apply in determinations of cost shifting.  This Part’s qua-
litative analysis is supplemented with some broader observations from 
a survey of sixty-five published federal cases discussing cost shifting.23  
that nonparty status was “[t]he most crucial factor” in the court’s decision to order 
reimbursement of the subpoenaed nonparty for $7200 in costs). 
19 See infra Section II.A. 
20 See infra subsection II.B.1. 
21 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
22 See infra Section II.C. 
23 To be robust, any quantitative conclusions on cost shifting should be based on a 
full review of every federal case on the topic, including magistrate opinions and orders, 
many of which are not selected for publication in any electronic database—an effort 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  In order to ascertain some possible trends, howev-
er, the following methodology was used.  First, a search of the Westlaw database was 
conducted for federal decisions dated before December 1, 2006, citing the McPeek, 
Rowe, or Zubulake cases or containing the words “electronic,” “discovery,” “shift,” and 
“cost” in close proximity to each other.  The second step involved a review of leading 
journal articles on cost shifting to identify important cases the searches may have 
missed.  These two steps provided a pool of twenty-eight relevant opinions prior to the 
2006 amendments.  In these twenty-eight cases, the court ordered cost shifting eleven 
times, although in three of them, the requesting party had offered to pay.  See, e.g., An-
tioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651-53 (D. Minn. 2002) (permit-
ting the requesting party to hire an expert at its own expense to create a “mirror im-
age” of the defendants’ computers and restore all data prior to a Rule 26(f) 
conference and the beginning of any formal discovery); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. 
mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (permitting the plaintiff to search 
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A significant majority of these cases involve individual plaintiffs re-
questing information preserved by corporate defendants on complex 
electronic networks and storage tapes.24  This pattern is unsurprising.  
the defendant’s computers for deleted files at the plaintiff’s own cost); Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same).  But see Cognex Corp. 
v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *4-5 (D. Mass. 
July 2, 2002) (noting that the plaintiff’s willingness to pay for restoration of backup 
tapes made the question of ordering discovery “a close call,” but denying discovery).  
Next, the above search was rerun to focus on opinions published after the 2006 
amendments.  Ken Withers’s comprehensive compilation of 223 federal cases relating 
to electronic discovery between December 1, 2006, and August 15, 2008 was also re-
viewed.  See KEN WITHERS, FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING ELECTRONIC DIS-
COVERY:  DECEMBER 1, 2006–AUGUST 15, 2008 (2008), http://www.ck10.uscourts.gov/ 
conference/downloads/ediscovery7.pdf.  These two searches located thirty-seven opi-
nions issued after December 1, 2006, that analyzed cost shifting outside of sanctions.  
Cost shifting was ordered in only three of these decisions, two of which involved re-
questing parties willing to pay to conduct their own forensic examinations of the res-
pondents’ computers.  See Sterle v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., No. 06-01584, 2008 WL 
961216, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2008) (ordering conditional cost shifting if the plain-
tiff did not uncover relevant documents from the defendant’s systems); Thielen v. 
Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 06-0016, 2007 WL 465680, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007) 
(ordering “forensic examination of plaintiff’s computer”).  The sole cost-shifting deci-
sion in which the requesting party was clearly opposed to paying expenses provides the 
example in the Introduction to this Comment.  See Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 
577, 578 (W.D. Wis. 2007).  This case is discussed in subsection III.B.3. 
24 See, e.g., Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578 (describing an individual plaintiff’s requests for 
documents related to employment discrimination); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., No. 05-1695, 2007 WL 983987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007) (explaining the lead 
class action plaintiff’s request for documents from the corporate defendant); Quinby v. 
WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing the individual plaintiff’s re-
quests related to gender and employment discrimination); Wiginton v. CB Richard 
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 569-70 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (recounting class action plaintiffs’ 
requests for documents relating to sexual harassment in the workplace); Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (illustrating the potential 
complexity of an individual plaintiff’s requests for extensive documentation related to 
employment discrimination); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 
F.R.D. 421, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing individual concert-promoter plaintiffs’ 
broad requests for documents from defendant booking agencies and other promoters 
relating to antitrust violations); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(explaining an individual plaintiff’s requests for documents related to employment 
discrimination); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-0897, 
1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (recounting requests by class action 
plaintiffs for documents from the corporate defendant); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 
F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Utah 1985) (describing the plaintiffs’ requests for documents re-
lated to age-based employment discrimination).  There are exceptions, of course.  
Sometimes the requesting party is a defendant.  See Coburn v. PN II, Inc., No. 07-00662, 
2008 WL 879746, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2008) (authorizing cost shifting where the de-
fendant former employer offered to pay for a forensic examination of the plaintiff’s 
home computer); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 562 
(W.D. Tenn. 2003) (ordering an individual defendant to bear some costs of the plain-
tiff’s restoration of network backup tapes in a trade secrets case where the defendant 
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Judicial intervention into cost shifting is most necessary when there is 
a structural imbalance in the amount of discovery each party must 
produce, such that the requesting party has little incentive to nego-
tiate mutual limits.25  Because of this structural characteristic, the 
terms “requesting parties” and “plaintiffs” are used interchangeably 
throughout this Comment unless otherwise noted in the discussion of 
particular cases.26 
My survey reveals that although courts have not uniformly applied 
Rule 26(b)(2), there appears to have been a decline in cost-shifting 
orders following the 2006 e-discovery amendments.27  Although the 
sample of cases in the survey may not necessarily be representative of 
all cost-shifting opinions,28 I posit that cost shifting is likely rarer now 
because the amended Rules make reasonably inaccessible data pre-
sumptively undiscoverable29 and also emphasize negotiation among 
parties, limiting the need for judicial intervention.30 
Part IV recognizes two troubling trends in cost-shifting cases:  (1) 
the tendency of some courts to liberally shift costs in lieu of denying 
meritless discovery and (2) the possibility that wealthier parties’ great-
er willingness to pay provides them with significantly upgraded access 
to discovery over poorer parties.  It concludes that as discovery costs 
continue to spiral upwards, the optimal discovery paradigm would 
had requested that the plaintiff produce network backup tapes).  While a large portion 
of cost-shifting cases involve individuals litigating against corporations, some cost-
shifting cases involve corporations on both sides.  See, e.g., Multitech. Servs., L.P. v. Veri-
zon Sw., No. 02-0702, 2004 WL 1553480, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (describing the 
plaintiff corporation’s requests for documents from the defendant corporation). 
25 This is most apparent in employment discrimination cases where the defendant 
employer maintains and produces most of the discovery.  See Rodney A. Satterwhite & 
Matthew J. Quatrara, Asymmetrical Warfare:  The Cost of Electronic Discovery in Employment 
Litigation, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶¶ 7–9, at 3-4 (2008), http://jolt.richmond.edu/ 
v14i3/article9.pdf (describing systemic discovery concerns in employment litigation 
where the median settlement is only $70,000 and the defendant employer is dispropor-
tionately responsible for restoring and producing the relevant discovery). 
26 Similarly, the terms “responding parties” and “defendants” are used interchan-
geably in the general text. 
27 See infra subsection III.B.3. 
28 See supra note 23 (discussing the limitations of the survey and describing its me-
thodology). 
29 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electron-
ically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably access-
ible because of undue burden or cost.”).  The two-tiered discovery system created by 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is discussed in subsection III.B.1. 
30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (“In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and 
basis of their claims . . . and develop a proposed discovery plan.”).  This negotiation, 
which often occurs surrounding a discovery conference, is discussed in subsection III.B.3. 
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resort to cost shifting only when informational uncertainty makes the 
likelihood of uncovering critical information a very close call.  The 
optimal approach would involve storage-tape sampling to determine 
the likelihood of uncovering relevant data,31 followed by a combina-
tion of the two-tiered discovery structure in amended Rule 26(b)(2), 
as well as the factors in the Zubulake test, to guide judges in determin-
ing when ordering both discovery and cost shifting is appropriate. 
I.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM:  EARLY APPROACHES TO COST SHIFTING 
In the mid-1990s, the traditional American paradigm of forcing 
each party to bear its own costs was undermined by one-sided and 
tremendous expenses associated with electronic discovery.  As e-
discovery became more common, the view that a producing party 
must automatically bear its associated expense as a cost of doing busi-
ness became as outmoded as Commodore 64 computers.  With indi-
vidual plaintiffs able to coerce corporate defendants into settling be-
cause of the high cost of discovery, courts began developing fact-
intensive balancing tests conditioning discovery on the requesting par-
ty’s ability to pay for it. 
A.  Electronic Discovery Expenses as a Cost of Doing Business 
When the Supreme Court reaffirmed the presumption that “the 
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery 
requests” in 1978,32 complex discovery typically entailed scores of 
young associates reviewing boxes of documents in corporate ware-
houses.33  Respondents who made their paper records available for in-
spection were able to limit plaintiffs’ fishing expeditions to the extent 
of the plaintiffs’ available manpower.34  Courts typically refused to shift 
31 Sampling is the process of restoring only a small portion of backup tapes for 
review, typically at the responding party’s expense, to better estimate the costs and like-
lihood of success of the entire requested production.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[B]y requiring a sample restoration of 
backup tapes, the entire cost-shifting analysis can be grounded in fact rather than 
guesswork.”). 
32 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); see also id. (not-
ing that the responding party may, however, “invoke the district court’s discretion un-
der Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue burden or expense’ in 
doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s payment of 
the costs of discovery”). 
33 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004) (stating that 
“warehouse” reviews kept the potential for fishing expeditions in check). 
34 In Bills v. Kennecott Corp., the court presciently noted that  
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costs for expensive productions by stating that the defendants should 
have foreseen the cost when they chose to use expensive storage me-
chanisms:  the so-called “cost of doing business” argument.35  For ex-
ample, in Delozier v. First National Bank of Gatlinburg, the defendant was 
ordered to pay for the photocopying of its records from microfilm be-
cause the defendant elected to save its records in that form.36  In Daewoo 
Electronics Co. v. United States, the United States Court of International 
Trade held that “[t]he normal and reasonable translation of electron-
ic data into a form usable by the discovering party should be the ordi-
nary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in the absence of a 
showing of extraordinary hardship.”37  For the most part, courts did 
not even consider allocating costs. 
Even when courts analyzed cost shifting prior to the mid-1990s, 
the result generally remained the same.  One of the earliest cases to 
consider cost shifting was Bills v. Kennecott Corp., an age discrimination 
action in which plaintiffs requested that their former employer pro-
vide printed computer records.38  The defendant printed the data and 
moved the court for reimbursement of the $5411 cost.39  Recognizing 
that the advisory notes to Rule 26(c) provided “no guidance” on de-
termining what type of discoverable computer-stored information 
constitutes an undue burden,40 the court set forth four relevant fac-
tors:  (1) the total cost of production; (2) “the relative expense and 
burden” to each party in obtaining the data; (3) whether the request-
ing party would be substantially burdened by the expense; and (4) 
whether the responding party would benefit in any way from product-
cost-shifting by means of simply producing volumes of records for inspection 
by the other side may be or may become a thing of the past in this computer 
age, [with] the only recourse [being] . . . a protective order under Rule 26(c) 
for undue expense or burden in order to shift the financial burden to the re-
questing party or to limit discovery.   
108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985). 
35 See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976) 
(holding that a defendant “may not excuse itself from compliance with Rule 34 . . . by 
utilizing a system of [nonelectronic] record-keeping which conceals rather than dis-
closes relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate them, thus 
rendering the production of the documents an excessively burdensome and costly ex-
pedition” (citation omitted)). 
36 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). 
37 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986). 
38 108 F.R.D. at 460. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 462. 
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ing the data.41  With all four factors favoring the requesting party, the 
court declined the defendant’s motion.42 
Although the Bills court stated that it was not promulgating an 
“ironclad formula,”43 the four-factor test became the “golden rule” for 
courts evaluating the problem until the Rowe decision.44  Despite its 
popularity, the Bills balancing test did not put an end to the “cost of 
doing business” argument.  For example, in 1995, the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois purported to apply the test in In re Brand Name Prescrip-
tion Drugs Antitrust Litigation, but it focused heavily on the defendant’s 
decision to store information on backup tapes as a reason to reject 
cost shifting.45  While acknowledging that the $50,000 to $70,000 re-
trieval cost was “expensive,” the court did “not believe that it is a bur-
den that the Class Plaintiffs should bear, particularly where, as here, 
‘the costliness of the discovery procedure involved is . . . a product of 
the defendant’s record-keeping scheme over which the [plaintiffs 
have] no control.’”46  This view did not persist long.  As typical discov-
ery expenses rose into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, courts 
began to move past the “cost of doing business” position. 
B.  The Rise of Electronic Discovery 
The rapid computerization of the 1990s quickly made “cost of doing 
business” decisions like In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs obsolete.  By 
the year 2000, as storage space became cheaper, nearly one-third of elec-
tronically stored documents remained solely in electronic form.47  Con-
ventional warehouse productions, with their expenses limited by the 
manpower available to requesting parties to photocopy data, were re-
placed by computerized environments with low searching and copying 
costs but tremendous restoration and processing expenses.48 
41 Id. at 464. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 463. 
44 See Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age:  De-
ciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 257, 282-83 (2000) (remarking that although the Bills court considered it “judi-
cially imprudent” to apply identical factors in all situations, several cases prior to 2000 
did just that (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 463)). 
45 No. 94-0897, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995). 
46 Id. (quoting Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1986)). 
47 See Giacobbe, supra note 44, at 259. 
48 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004). 
2010] When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? 1533 
As corporations implemented archival systems designed to recover 
lost data, they unwittingly provided plaintiffs with a fertile new source 
of potentially relevant documents, raising discovery costs immensely.  
Because discovery disproportionately burdened corporate defendants,49 
some plaintiffs began to strategically employ “weapons of mass discov-
ery”50 to force settlements.51  So long as a plaintiff could meet the mi-
nimal threshold requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) for the discoverability 
of information,52 it could present the defendant with a Hobson’s choice 
of funding prohibitively expensive discovery or settling the suit.  For ex-
ample, when plaintiffs suing a small company realized that it held about 
115 backup tapes in a small warehouse, they strategically pushed the 
magistrate judge to grant their motion to compel, presenting a $1.25 
million price tag for the small company and resulting in an instant set-
tlement.53  In cases like this, the magistrate judge, whose authority is re-
stricted to nondispositive actions,54 could nevertheless effectively dis-
pose of an action by granting an improvident discovery order.55 
According to the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery Sur-
vey Report, litigants spent $2.79 billion on electronic discovery in 
49 See Satterwhite & Quatrara, supra note 25, ¶¶ 7–9, at 3-4 (noting the disparities 
in costs between employers and employees in employment litigation). 
50 See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Be-
fore the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 4 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
e-discovery/0112frcp.pdf [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Greg McCurdy, Senior 
Attorney, Microsoft Corporation) (referencing the term used by a member of the Flor-
ida plaintiffs’ bar). 
51 Id. at 4, 11. 
52 Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . [that is] reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
53 Hearing, supra note 50, at 11 (statement of Greg McCurdy, Senior Attorney, Mi-
crosoft Corporation). 
54 The authority of a magistrate judge is broadly restricted:   
[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretri-
al matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for 
judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an in-
dictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a 
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involunta-
rily dismiss an action. 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
55 District courts review magistrates’ discovery orders under the highly deferential 
clear error standard.  See id. 
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2007, an increase of 43% over 2006.56  An ongoing copyright in-
fringement suit between software giants Oracle Corporation and SAP 
AG illustrates some of these expenses in practice.57  The plaintiff, 
Oracle, requested discovery from 165 defendant custodians, which 
would have taken a year to produce and cost $16.5 million in addition 
to other discovery from central repositories.58  Relying on the propor-
tionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii),59 discussed in Part III, and 
Rule 1’s overarching mandate to provide a “just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action and proceeding,”60 the magistrate 
judge limited discovery to 120 custodians, reducing the defendant’s es-
timated expense for this particular request to $11.5 million without 
engaging in cost shifting.61  Though the multimillion-dollar expenses 
in the Oracle case represent a rather extreme example, electronic dis-
covery undeniably became a pricey proposition over the last fifteen 
years, requiring careful management, including cost shifting by judges. 
C.  The Move Toward Cost Shifting 
As it became clear that electronic discovery could not be treated 
exactly like traditional discovery, courts started balancing plaintiffs’ 
legitimate requests for information with defendants’ right not to be 
unduly burdened by discovery.  The possibility of shifting costs in ap-
propriate cases presented a nuanced solution to the inherent uncer-
tainty of electronic discovery—that is, whether costly restoration was 
likely to lead to the discovery of relevant documents.  Backup tapes 
save mirror images of the user’s computer structure for catastrophic 
recovery purposes, but they are not designed to allow users to easily 
cull relevant documents.62  Because backup tapes are not indexed and 
56 See George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, A Look at the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Survey, LAW 
TECH. NEWS, Aug. 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN. 
jsp?id=1202423646479#. 
57 See Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, No. 07-01658 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.tnlawsuit.com/uploads/Order%20Re%20Scope%20of%20Discovery%20o
f%20Electronically%20Stored%20Information.pdf. 
58 Id. slip op. at 2. 
59 The Rule authorizes the court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it 
determines that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ re-
sources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” 
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
61 Oracle, No. 07-01658, slip op. at 3. 
62 See Ross Chaffin, Comment, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising 
Cost and Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 122 (2006) 
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do not capture documents created and deleted prior to the scheduled 
backup, typically neither party can prove that restoration would cer-
tainly lead to the production of relevant data.  Cost shifting permits 
judges to deal with the uncertainty by accommodating plaintiffs who 
have good reason to believe that backup tapes contain crucial infor-
mation while protecting defendants from financial hardship.  Magi-
strate Judge James Francis, author of the influential Rowe cost-shifting 
analysis discussed in subsection II.B.1, has pointed out that when the 
judge is only forty percent certain that the restored information would 
be useful, shifting some costs is an improvement over simply granting 
or denying discovery altogether.63 
The move toward cost shifting began in the mid-1990s, with the 
Manual for Complex Litigation recommending it when parties “request 
production in a form that can be created only at substantial expense 
for additional programming.”64  Despite this recommendation, e-
discovery cost shifting prior to the year 2000 was rare.65  Courts consi-
dered ordering it only when plaintiffs asked for permission to conduct 
forensic examinations of defendants’ computers at their own expense.  
By December 2006, however, at least eleven courts ordered the re-
questing parties to bear expenses, often over the latter’s vigorous ob-
jections to the allocation.66  Cost shifting even found application in 
nonelectronic discovery cases.67  The next Part details the advantages 
(describing the large storage capacity of backup tapes and noting the high costs asso-
ciated with their restoration). 
63 See James C. Francis IV, Preservation, Production & Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery, in 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008:  WHAT CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL 
NEED TO KNOW 11, 19 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-
783, 2008). 
64 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.446 (1985). 
65 This Comment’s survey identified only two cases ordering cost shifting for elec-
tronic discovery up to and including the year 2000.  See Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. my-
Simon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (permitting the plaintiff to search 
the defendant’s computers for deleted files at the plaintiff’s own cost); Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same). 
66 Cf. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(ordering the plaintiffs in an employment and gender discrimination case to pay 25% 
of the costs of restoring the defendant’s backup tapes, after a sample revealed a 4.5% 
to 6.5% responsive rate); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (directing corporate parties in an intellectual property suit to split costs for ex-
tracting source code from the defendant’s database). 
67 Although this Comment focuses strictly on e-discovery, it should be noted that the 
balancing tests developed for e-discovery, like the Zubulake test discussed in Section II.C, 
have been modified and used in nonelectronic discovery settings.  See Multitech. Servs., 
L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-0702, 2004 WL 1553480, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) 
(modifying the Zubulake factors and ordering cost shifting for nonelectronic interrogato-
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and drawbacks of the multifactor cost-shifting tests developed by 
judges prior to the 2006 electronic discovery amendments. 
II.  COST-SHIFTING TESTS PRIOR TO THE  
2006 E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS 
Though courts generally appreciated the ability to shift costs as a 
way to resolve informational uncertainties, they had to determine 
when cost shifting would be appropriate and what percent of the ex-
penses should be shared.  Some courts eschewed multifactor analysis, 
considering instead whether a plaintiff’s requests seemed to offend 
the spirit of Rule 1, which states that the intent and purpose of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”68  For example, courts have cited Rule 
1 to prohibit outright discovery that “would properly be characterized 
as a fishing expedition, causing needless expense and burden to all 
concerned”69 and to refuse reimbursement of expenses incurred by 
parties in electronically converting files for their own litigation pur-
poses.70  Rule 26(c) authorizes judges, “for good cause, [to] issue an 
order to protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or expense, 
including . . . specifying terms . . . for the disclosure or discovery.”71  
Yet neither Rule 1 nor Rule 26(c) provides particular guidance on 
when cost shifting is appropriate.  Under the 2000 amendments, Rule 
26(b)(2)(iii) offered five factors to consider in weighing the “burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery” against its “likely benefit”:  “the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, 
ries); see also UPS, Inc. v. Net, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Therefore, the 
Court finds that the maturation of Rule 26(b)(2) over several decades allows judges to 
use the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2) with increasing frequency and with an eye toward 
equity.  This, undeniably, includes cost-shifting in [non-electronic] discovery.”). 
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  See generally Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L. 
Sternberg, In Pursuit of FRCP 1:  Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Dis-
covery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 176, at 87 (2007), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article11.pdf (“[L]itigants should be aggressive in 
invoking [Rule] 1 as a basis for the innovative use of search strategies and cost-shifting 
to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the board in discovery.”). 
69 N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). 
70 See In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.N.J. 2002) (refus-
ing to order the plaintiffs to reimburse half of the costs of the defendant’s conversion of 
paper copies into electronic form when the defendants did so for their own use in litiga-
tion); Hines v. Widnall, 183 F.R.D. 596, 601 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (“[I]t is simply illogical to 
require plaintiffs to help defendant pay for something [defendant] did voluntarily.”). 
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
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the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the impor-
tance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”72  These five factors, 
however, were intended to guide the court to limit the frequency or 
extent of discovery, which is a different question than when discovery 
should proceed but with cost shifting.  Although some courts insisted 
that Rule 26(b)(2) sufficiently guided both discovery-production and 
cost-shifting decisions,73 others applied three widely used tests prior to 
the 2006 e-discovery amendments:  (1) a marginal utility test from 
McPeek v. Ashcroft,74 (2) an eight-factor test from Rowe Entertainment, 
Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,75 and (3) a seven-factor weighted test 
from Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.76 
A.  The Marginal Utility Test 
Steven McPeek, an employee at the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
alleged that the DOJ failed to keep its prior sexual harassment settle-
ment with him confidential and retaliated against him.77  He pro-
pounded requests to have the DOJ search its backup tapes for data 
that might have been deleted by the DOJ’s computer users but pre-
served on the tapes.78  Although he established that his supervisors 
used their computers for word processing and e-mail, McPeek pre-
sented no evidence that there were particularly relevant deleted e-
mails likely to be recovered.79 
Magistrate Judge John Facciola began by dismissing the implica-
tion from In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs that restoring all backup 
tapes is necessary in every case and that the defendant should pay for 
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000).  Following the 2006 amendments, this pro-
portionality test became a guide for evaluating whether parties showed “good cause” 
when requesting information that “is not reasonably accessible because of undue bur-
den or cost.”  For dicussion of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) following the 2006 amendments, see 
Section III.B. 
73 See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. 
Md. 2003) (stating that in addition to the marginal utility, Rowe, and Zubulake tests, “it 
also can be argued with some force that the Rule 26(b)(2) balancing factors are all 
that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result when considering the scope of dis-
covery of electronic records”). 
74 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). 
75 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
76 217 F.R.D. 309, 320-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
77 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 32. 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 33 (stating that there was only a “theoretical possibility” the tapes might 
contain something relevant to a claim or defense). 
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the restoration as a cost of its “choice to use computers.”80  Judge Fac-
ciola proceeded, 
A fairer approach borrows, by analogy, from the economic principle of 
“marginal utility.”  The more likely it is that the backup tape contains in-
formation that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the 
government agency search at its own expense.  The less likely it is, the 
more unjust it would be to make the agency search at its own expense.  
The difference is “at the margin.”
81
 
Judge Facciola recognized that the marginal utility approach by itself 
does not involve economic considerations and stated that these con-
siderations should also be analyzed to prevent defendants from shoul-
dering an “undue burden.”82  Without elaborating on how the econom-
ic side of his test might be evaluated, however, Judge Facciola ordered 
the DOJ to restore one year worth of backup tapes and to detail its costs 
to help decide whether further searches were necessary.83 
Other courts followed McPeek’s marginal utility analysis and in-
cremental approach.  In Byers v. Illinois State Police, plaintiffs alleging 
employment discrimination demanded e-mails that could be recov-
ered only by licensing and reprogramming the defendant’s old e-mail 
program at a cost between $20,000 and $30,000.84  The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the backup tapes would contain a particular racist e-mail 
substantiating their claims, but none of the persons they deposed con-
firmed the existence of the e-mail.85  The court focused its inquiry on 
the plaintiffs’ inability to establish the likelihood of uncovering rele-
vant e-mails compared to the significant burden of the request and 
shifted all restoration costs to the plaintiffs.86  The court appeared par-
ticularly exasperated that the plaintiffs requested eight years worth of 
e-mails rather than targeting the months leading up to the discrimina-
tion.87  Complete cost shifting would provide plaintiffs with an “incen-
tive to focus their requests.”88 
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 Id. at 34. 
82 Id.; see also id. (“If the likelihood of finding something was the only criterion, 
there is a risk that someone will have to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
produce a single e-mail.”). 
83 Id. at 34-35. 
84 No. 99-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002). 
85 Id. at *11-12. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at *12. 
88 Id. 
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In the $30 million contract litigation AAB Joint Venture v. United 
States, the plaintiff contended that the defendant’s policies called for 
the creation of certain relevant e-mails and other substantial docu-
mentation and that this information would likely exist in the defen-
dant’s backup tapes.89  The defendant conceded that some relevant e-
mails were presumably located on the backup tapes but balked at the 
$85,000 to $150,000 restoration cost90 and argued that other allegedly 
pertinent documents likely did not exist on the backup tapes at all.91  
Citing McPeek, the court ordered the defendant, at its own expense, to 
restore all of the pertinent e-mails because the costs of discovery were 
small compared to the potential damages and the likelihood of unco-
vering relevant information was high.92  Finding that the plaintiff had 
“provided no clear evidence to indicate that [the other] relevant docu-
ments [were] likely to be contained in the backup tapes,”93 however, the 
court ordered only one-fourth of the other backup tapes produced.94 
In Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, Kansas, the plaintiffs re-
quested restoration of the city’s deleted e-mails from backup tapes 
that were recycled every six weeks.95  Applying the marginal utility test, 
the court compared the “minimal” efficacy of finding relevant, non-
overwritten information on these tapes with the prohibitive $100,000 
restoration cost.96  The low marginal utility of conducting the discov-
ery led the court to deny the plaintiff’s motion to compel.97 
These cases evidence the advantages and drawbacks of the mar-
ginal utility test.  The test does not explicitly consider the resources of 
the parties, and it subjugates economic considerations to the predo-
minant question of whether the proposed discovery would be likely to 
reveal relevant data.  If a plaintiff can make a strong showing that sto-
rage tapes would contain specific e-mails, as in AAB Joint Venture, the 
discovery will be ordered unless the cost is remarkably prohibitive.98  
Though this test is effective in precluding marginally worthless discov-
89 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 438, 442 (2007). 
90 Id. at 439. 
91 Id. at 438. 
92 Id. at 443. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 444. 
95 No. 06-4004, 2007 WL 1246200, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007). 
96 Id. at *4-5. 
97 Id. at *5. 
98 See AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 438, 442-43 (2007) (or-
dering discovery of storage tapes that defendants conceded might have relevant infor-
mation despite a $150,000 restoration cost). 
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ery, it is not an effective cost-shifting test.  Courts that purported to ap-
ply the McPeek test supplemented it with additional factors, such as the 
cost of discovery compared to potential damages99 and the specificity 
of plaintiff’s requests,100 as a way to curtail overbroad discovery. 
By failing to explicitly consider the parties’ resources and economic 
costs, the test also diverges from the economic concept of marginal util-
ity that it seeks to embody.  Marginal utility theory envisions that a buy-
er and a seller arrive at a price at which each party believes it is subjec-
tively obtaining more utility than is provided by the money or product it 
is giving up.101  Discovery is not a voluntary transaction, however; defen-
dants typically receive no value from even small self-productions.  Fram-
ing the issue as whether the litigation as a whole obtains some objective 
utility from the discovery of more documents at the expense of a single 
party contradicts marginal utility theory’s emphasis on the preferences 
of the specific parties to the transaction.  The marginal utility test does 
not focus on a particular party’s ability to control costs or the relative 
benefit to the respondent in producing the data.  These limitations 
help explain why Magistrate Judge James Francis in Rowe102 and District 
Judge Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake103 adopted marginal utility—the like-
lihood of discovering critical information—as a relevant factor in their 
tests but supplemented it with additional factors. 
B.  The Rowe Test and Discovery Protocol 
A year after McPeek v. Ashcroft, Magistrate Judge James Francis of 
the Southern District of New York developed an eight-factor test that 
was “hailed as the ‘gold standard’ of cost allocation adjudication” be-
fore the Zubulake analysis supplanted it.104  Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. 
99 See, e.g., id. 
100 See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11-12 
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002). 
101 See generally Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws:  Value Foundations of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (1989) (advocating for a legal system 
premised on the concept of Pareto efficiency). 
102 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (adopting, from the McPeek marginal utility test, the likelihood of a 
successful search as its second factor). 
103 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating 
that the first two factors, (1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to 
discover relevant information and (2) the availability of such information from other 
sources, “compris[e] the marginal utility test” and “are the most important”). 
104 Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information:  The December 2006 Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 183 (2006). 
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William Morris Agency, Inc. also developed an accompanying discovery 
protocol whose plaintiff-friendly attributes raise additional concerns 
about cost shifting. 
1.  The Eight-Factor Rowe Test 
In Rowe, black concert promoters contended that they were ex-
cluded from concerts with white bands through discriminatory and 
anticompetitive practices by booking agencies and other promoters.105  
As is common in discrimination106 and antitrust107 actions, the plaintiffs 
propounded sweeping discovery requests costing upwards of $9.75 
million for just one of the several defendants.108  After finding that the 
type of e-mails sought was discoverable, Judge Francis set out a cost-
shifting test premised on eight factors: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; 
(2) the likelihood of discovering critical information; 
(3) the availability of such information from other sources; 
(4) the purposes for which the responding party maintains the re-
quested data; 
(5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the information; 
(6) the total cost associated with production; 
(7) the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to 
do so; and 
(8) the resources available to each party.
109
 
 The first factor seeks to penalize overbroad requests when a party 
does not identify any specific factual issue that the discovery would 
105 Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 423. 
106 In the employment context, plaintiffs will typically prove discrimination using 
indirect evidence, which necessitates reviewing broad collections of e-mails to piece 
together discriminatory intent.  See, e.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 576 
(7th Cir. 2001) (“Direct evidence cases . . . are very rare in the employment discrimina-
tion context because employers are generally very careful to avoid statements that sug-
gest discriminatory intent—whether their true intentions are discriminatory or not.”). 
107 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (“[I]t is one 
thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, 
but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.” 
(citation omitted)). 
108 See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 425 (explaining the potential cost to William Morris 
Agency, Inc. of cataloging, restoring, and processing e-mails if the e-mails on all back-
up tapes needed to be produced). 
109 Id. at 429. 
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help to prove.  The next factor comes from McPeek’s marginal utility 
test.  The third factor shifts costs when “equivalent information either 
has already been made available or is accessible in a different format 
at less expense,” and is typically relevant when plaintiffs request elec-
tronic conversion of documents given to them in hard copy.110 
The fourth factor, the purposes for which the responding party 
maintains the requested data, is curious.  Ironically, after criticizing 
the “cost of doing business” argument advanced in Daewoo Electronics 
Co. v. United States,111 Judge Francis cited the case to establish a distinc-
tion between files kept for a business purpose (weighing against cost 
shifting) and those maintained strictly for disaster-recovery purposes 
(favoring cost shifting).112 
The fifth factor seeks to maintain costs with the defendant when 
the restoration would bring her technical advantages—such as spur-
ring her to create a program that she could use to search her data in 
the future—or litigation advantages (e.g., if there is a high likelihood 
that the restored files would help her own claims and defenses).113  
The total cost of the production, the sixth factor, is somewhat vague as 
a stand-alone factor.  Judge Francis cited114 cases finding that a sub-
stantial burden existed for expenditures of $16,000,115 $5000,116 and 
even $1680.117 
The seventh factor, the ability of each party to control costs, has a 
structural quirk causing it to lean toward cost shifting in nearly every 
case.  Plaintiffs arguing that a defendant’s cost estimates are inflated 
typically offer less expensive alternatives in order to win the sixth fac-
tor.  They are then seen as being better able to control costs, however, 
110 Id. at 430 (citing Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94-2120, 1996 WL 
22976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996)). 
111 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
112 See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430-31 (“If a party maintains electronic data for the pur-
pose of utilizing it in connection with current activities, it may be expected to respond 
to discovery requests at its own expense . . . [but] a party that happens to retain vestigi-
al data for no current business purpose, but only in a case of an emergency . . . should 
not be put to the expense of producing it.” (citation omitted)). 
113 See id. at 431 (concluding that “[w]here the responding party itself benefits 
from the production, there is less rationale for shifting costs to the requesting party”). 
114 See id. 
115 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1978) (finding 
that “a threshold expense of $16,000 . . . hardly can be viewed as an insubstantial bur-
den” on a defendant whose assets exceeded $500 million). 
116 See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,294, at 
76,345 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
117 See id. 
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and lose the seventh factor, as the plaintiffs did in Rowe.118  Plaintiffs 
are also nearly always deemed to be in the best position to incremen-
tally “calibrate their discovery based on the information obtained 
from initial sampling” and decide whether further searches would be 
justified.119   
The last factor improves on the marginal utility test by inquiring 
into each party’s ability to pay, even if the costs are modest in absolute 
terms.120  Without specifying whether any one factor is more important 
than another, Judge Francis found that, in the case under his consid-
eration, the results tipped heavily toward shifting all the recovery costs 
to the plaintiffs.121 
Courts substantively applied The Rowe analysis in at least three 
other cases.122  The most important pattern evident from the cases is 
that mechanical application of the test skewed the result toward cost 
shifting.123  Indeed, all of the reported decisions identified through 
this Comment’s survey that applied the Rowe test shifted costs.  As 
pointed out by commentators,  
[I]n many instances, at least four factors—the purposes of retention, 
benefit to the parties, total costs, and ability to control costs—will favor 
the responding party.  If courts simply conduct an absolute comparison 
of the eight Rowe factors, the responding party [would] need to attain 
118 See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431-32 (“The plaintiffs have professed an ability to limit 
the costs of discovery of e-mails to a much greater extent than defendants.  Of course, 
this factor alone does not dictate cost-shifting; the defendants could be required to pay 
the bill for the less expensive methodologies proposed by the plaintiffs.”). 
119 Id. at 432. 
120 See id. (noting that without cost shifting, the cost of production could outstrip 
one party’s resources). 
121 Id. 
122 See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 02-4721, 2003 WL 
21277129, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2003) (declining to shift costs for the defendant’s 
privilege review prior to disclosure of redacted image devices to the plaintiffs); Med-
tronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553-58 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) 
(shifting costs for restoration of those storage tapes least likely to contain relevant in-
formation); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, 
at *6-7 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (shifting all costs to the requesting party and adopting 
the Rowe analysis); see also In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., No. 98-7161, 2003 
WL 23254, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003) (“[T]he attorneys should read Magistrate Judge 
Francis’s opinion in [Rowe].  Then Deloitte and plaintiffs should confer, in person or by 
telephone, and discuss the eight factors listed in that opinion.” (citation omitted)). 
123 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Indeed, 
of the handful of reported opinions that apply Rowe or some modification thereof, all of 
them have ordered the cost of discovery to be shifted to the requesting party.”). 
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just one more factor to shift the costs to the requesting party.
124
 
Often, the first or second factor tipped the scales.  Courts saw the 
plaintiff’s requests as too broad,125 or the plaintiff failed to prove that 
the backup tapes contained some reasonably high percentage of rele-
vant e-mails.126  Interestingly, all of the judges that have applied Rowe 
have held the third factor—the resources available to each party—to 
be neutral, without extended discussion.127  In fact, the Rowe court it-
self did not provide any record of the specific assets and resources 
available to plaintiffs and defendants. 
In addition to criticizing Rowe for favoring cost shifting in close 
calls where the traditional presumption against cost shifting should 
instead prevail, some courts have also faulted the Rowe test for being 
incomplete, encouraging mechanical counting of the factors, and fail-
ing to guide the courts toward developing a full factual record 
through sampling.128  In the influential Zubulake decision, Judge Shira 
Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York pointed out that the 
test also improperly omitted two factors specified in the then-
controlling Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) language under the 2000 amendments:  
the amount in controversy and the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation.129  Judge Scheindlin also contended that Rowe’s fourth 
factor, the purposes for retaining the data, had little relevance to the 
accessibility and cost of ESI.130 
The Rowe test spurred two trends common to other cost-shifting 
tests:  a lack of uniformity in application and an increased willingness 
by courts to order potentially irrelevant and costly discovery supple-
mented by cost shifting.  The Medtronic decision symbolizes both trends.  
In this trade secrets case, the defendant moved for production by the 
plaintiff of nearly 1000 backup tapes, seeking e-mails that the plaintiff 
124 ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:  LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 5.05(C), at 5-30 (2010). 
125 See, e.g., Medtronic, 229 F.R.D. at 554-55 (“Michelson has not specifically limited 
his requests by date, despite his apparent understanding that tapes from 1997 to 2000 
are those most likely to reveal the electronic mail he seeks . . . . [T]his factor weighs in 
favor of Michelson bearing part of the production cost.”). 
126 See, e.g., Murphy Oil, 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (noting that without evidence that 
“the e-mails are likely to be a gold mine,” the mere inference that e-mails may reflect 
more candor than hard-copy documents suggests that the marginal value of searching 
e-mails on backup tapes was modest at best (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430)). 
127 See, e.g., Medtronic, 229 F.R.D. at 558. 
128 See, e.g., Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320 (discussing the Rowe test’s drawbacks). 
129 Id. at 321; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000). 
130 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 321-22. 
2010] When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? 1545 
conceded may have existed on some post-1997 tapes.131  The expense 
was estimated as being in “the range of several million” dollars, which 
represented about two percent of the amount at issue in the suit.132 
The court began by determining that the requesting party, Mi-
chelson, failed the specificity and marginal utility factors.  Michelson 
asked for information prior to 1997, “despite his apparent under-
standing that tapes from 1997 to 2000 are those most likely to reveal 
the electronic mail he seeks.”133  Michelson could identify only seven 
relevant pages out of a million pages previously produced, diminish-
ing the likelihood of finding many relevant e-mails.134  Thus far, the 
court’s analysis appears straightforward.  During its evaluation of the 
fourth Rowe factor, which is intended to shift costs if the backup tapes 
were intended only for disaster recovery, however, the court applied 
McPeek’s marginal utility test.135  The court implied that if there were a 
showing that the backup tapes contained relevant information, this 
factor itself would count against cost shifting.136  This doubled the effect 
of Rowe’s second factor, which incorporates the marginal utility test.  
The court also curiously determined that both parties would benefit 
from obtaining the information, although the producing party as-
serted “that it has not yet searched the backup tapes for litigation-
related data and, because of the expense involved, would be unlikely 
to do so unless compelled by court order.”137 
Finding that cost shifting was generally appropriate in the case, the 
court determined the amount based on the dates of the tapes.  For data 
on one set of tapes from 1997 to 2002, the requesting party had to pay 
forty percent of the restoration costs.138  Another set of tapes from 1997 
through the production date would be disclosed upon Michelson’s 
payment of all restoration costs, as well as all of the opposing party’s re-
131 Medtronic, 229 F.R.D. at 553. 
132 Id. at 558. 
133 Id. at 554-55. 
134 Id. at 555. 
135 See id. at 557 (“Because Michelson has made no showing that the entire spec-
trum of backup tapes will contain information relevant [to] the cause’s claims or de-
fenses, this factor weighs in favor of shifting production costs to Michelson, the re-
questing party.”). 
136 Id. 
137 Id.  Curiously, the court concluded “that the parties will equally benefit from 
the electronic discovery, and this factor does not sway the cost-shifting analysis in favor 
of either party.”  Id. 
138 Id. at 560-61. 
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levance review expenses and half of its privilege-review expenses.139  Mi-
chelson could obtain a third set of tapes created on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1996, by paying one hundred percent of the recovery, relevance-
review, and privilege-review costs.140  Thus, although Michelson himself 
conceded that there would be little relevant information on the 1996 
tape, he was permitted to probe its contents simply by reimbursing the 
defendant’s expenses.  Decisions like Medtronic illustrate the trouble-
some pattern of courts ordering discovery accompanied by cost shifting 
when perhaps no discovery should be ordered at all.141 
2.  The Plaintiff-Friendly Rowe Discovery Protocol 
Although primarily known for its cost-shifting analysis, the Rowe 
decision also provided an influential (and plaintiff-friendly) discovery 
protocol.  Under this protocol, (1) the plaintiffs designate a forensic 
expert subject to the defendant’s objections and a confidentiality or-
der; (2) the expert creates a mirror image of the backup tapes; (3) the 
plaintiffs formulate a search procedure to which the defendants may 
object; (4) the plaintiffs’ lawyers or their experts conduct the searches 
and review them on an “attorneys’ eyes only” basis, which does not 
constitute any waiver of privilege or confidentiality; (5) the plaintiffs 
provide hard-copy e-mails that they consider material to the defen-
dants, after which point the defendants pay their own costs for elec-
tronically converting or modifying the information; and (6) the defen-
dants review the selected pool of documents and lodge confidentiality 
and privilege objections.142  Alternatively, a defendant can review its da-
tabase at its own expense; remove privileged, confidential, and irrele-
vant files; and produce a redacted mirror image to the plaintiffs, after 
which the remaining process would continue from step three.143 
This protocol, cited approvingly in at least two cases,144 eliminates 
the defendant’s previous Hobson’s choice of paying for restoration or 
139 Id. at 562. 
140 Id. 
141 See infra Part IV (discussing the optimal cost-shifting framework). 
142 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
143 Id. 
144 See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 02-4791, 2002 WL 31655326, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) (adopting a slightly modified Rowe protocol but leaving it 
open for further modification upon agreement of both parties); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 
v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *4-10 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) 
(shifting all costs to the requesting party and adopting the Rowe protocol).  But see 
Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *3-
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settling the case, but it replaces it with another one:  giving the plaintiff 
unfettered access to storage tapes containing the entirety of the defen-
dant’s business records, or paying for the restoration itself in order to 
redact confidential information.145  The advantages to the requesting 
parties, who are typically plaintiffs, are apparent.  A wealthy plaintiff 
would eagerly volunteer to pay the expenses if it meant getting access 
to the defendant’s entire business and e-mail records, thereby getting a 
firsthand look at any documents that the defendant may later claw 
back as privileged.  Although plaintiffs would not be able to use those 
documents at trial or be able to secure a subject-matter waiver, they 
would benefit from knowing the opposite side’s strategies and business 
records.  And the defendant, in undertaking its own privilege review of 
the immense amount of data, would still run the risk of missing impor-
tant documents and effecting a subject-matter waiver.146 
It would certainly be possible for a court to craft a more neutral 
discovery order permitting defendants to hire their own experts, re-
view the documents first, produce only relevant nonprivileged docu-
ments to the plaintiffs, and be reimbursed for the entire technical res-
toration costs and attorney review times.147  Allowing the plaintiff’s 
expert to serve at the direction of the defendant would also remove 
some privacy worries.148  None of the cases surveyed for this Comment 
actually followed this type of more defendant-friendly protocol.  The 
5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (citing the Rowe decision for its “detailed discussion” of proto-
col but declining to compel discovery and stating that if the court were to do so, it 
would permit defendants to review their own production for privilege prior to produc-
tion at the plaintiff’s cost). 
145 See Murphy Oil, 2002 WL 246439, at *6-8 (noting that a defendant should be 
able to assert privilege—and pay for the privilege review—without having to bear the 
initial cost of production). 
146 Counsel reviewing millions of pages typically relies on search terms and key-
words, which can miss important information.  See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative 
Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 256-57 (D. Md. 2008) (holding that the producing party 
waived attorney-client privilege for 165 inadvertently produced documents, despite 
screening the production through seventy different keyword searches, because counsel 
failed to conduct additional quality assurance). 
147 See Cognex, 2002 WL 32309413, at *3 (citing the possibility of crafting such an 
order in response to the plaintiff’s willingness to pay costs, but declining to order dis-
covery because of the small likelihood of uncovering important relevant evidence). 
148 This protocol could, of course, become susceptible to abuse from the defen-
dant’s side.  In Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., the plaintiffs agreed to pay for an expert 
acting at the defendant’s direction to recover the defendant’s files. No. 04-40346, 2008 
WL 474127, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2008).  When the defendants modified the list 
of search terms beyond their agreement with the plaintiffs and ran up the expert’s bill, 
they became responsible for paying the additional charges.  Id. at *5-6. 
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closest examples are Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles,149 Simon Property 
Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.,150 and Coburn v. PN II, Inc.,151 three cases in 
which an expert, acting as an agent of the court, recovered the respond-
ing party’s information and provided it to respondent’s counsel, who 
ran her own searches and produced relevant information.152  Given that 
the plaintiff-friendly Rowe protocol emerged after the more defendant-
friendly Playboy protocol, it appears that liberalized cost shifting in Rowe 
also brought tactical protocol advantages to the plaintiffs. 
C.  The Zubulake Test 
Laura Zubulake, a UBS sales director, was fired two months after 
filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint.153  
She sued UBS for gender discrimination and retaliation, and she pro-
pounded a discovery request for “[a]ll documents concerning any 
communication by or between UBS employees concerning Plain-
tiff.”154  UBS initially produced 100 pages of e-mails, which Zubulake 
demonstrated were incomplete because she herself had provided ap-
proximately 450 pages of e-mail correspondence.155  In what Judge 
Shira Scheindlin termed “a textbook example of the difficulty of ba-
lancing the competing needs of broad discovery and manageable 
costs,” Zubulake requested backup-tape recovery costing approximate-
ly $175,000 in order to uncover evidence that might lead to a verdict 
upwards of $13 million.156 
Judge Scheindlin, then a member of the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, took the opportunity to fill in gaps left in the previous 
cost-shifting tests, beginning with the previously unanswered thre-
shold question of when it would even be appropriate to conduct a 
cost-shifting analysis.  Judge Scheindlin stated that “cost-shifting [un-
der Rule 26(c)] should be considered only when electronic discovery 
imposes an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party.”157  
Looking to the then-controlling Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) language under 
149 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
150 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
151 No. 07-00662, 2008 WL 879746 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2008). 
152 Id. at *4-5; Simon Property, 194 F.R.D. at 641; Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 
153 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
154 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 
plaintiff’s request for production). 
155 Id. at 313. 
156 Id. at 311-12 & n.9. 
157 Id. at 318 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)). 
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the 2000 amendments, Judge Scheindlin noted that the burden of 
discovery is “‘undue’ when it ‘outweighs its likely benefit, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the 
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.’”158  Mov-
ing beyond the text of the Rules, Judge Scheindlin found that “whether 
production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns 
primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format,” 
which itself “turns largely on the media on which it is stored.”159  Inac-
cessible media comprises backup tapes and deleted data existing in 
clusters on hard-drive space that has not yet been overwritten.160 
After criticizing the Rowe test for favoring cost shifting and failing 
to encourage sampling,161 Judge Scheindlin developed a new analytical 
framework weighing seven factors in descending order: 
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover re-
levant information; 
2. The availability of such information from other sources; 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to 
each party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to 
do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
162
 
Cautioning that the test should not be applied in “check-list” fashion, 
Judge Scheindlin placed the most weight on the first two factors, 
which were derived from the marginal utility test.163  The next three 
factors addressed the expense of the production.  Judge Scheindlin 
noted that the sixth factor, measuring the importance of the litigation 
for the broader public, will rarely come into play.164  When it does, 
158 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000)). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 318-20. 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 128-30. 
162 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 322. 
163 Id. at 322-23. 
164 Id. at 323.  Courts applying Zubulake thus far have held that employment dis-
crimination, manipulation of the securities market, and intellectual property disputes 
do not raise important public issues. 
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however, it can predominate over others.165  The last factor is the “least 
important because it is fair to presume that the response to a discov-
ery request generally benefits the requesting party.”166  When the pro-
duction also benefits the responding party, however, this factor weighs 
against cost shifting.167 
Judge Scheindlin stressed the importance of sampling, first seen 
in McPeek, to develop a factual record that would support a more in-
formed application of the test.168  To that end, UBS was ordered to 
produce all responsive e-mails from its accessible active space and all 
e-mails from any five inaccessible backup tapes selected by Zubu-
lake.169  The sampling revealed 1541 e-mails, of which 600 were 
deemed nonprivileged and responsive to Zubulake’s request.170 
In her opinion following the sampling, Judge Scheindlin applied 
her cost-shifting test.171  The marginal utility factors tipped slightly 
against cost shifting because a full 68 of the 600 e-mails produced in 
the sample demonstrated a “hostile relationship” between the plaintiff 
and her supervisor, although none evidenced direct gender discrimi-
nation.172  The economic factors also leaned against cost shifting.  The 
cost of the remaining production, $165,955, was dwarfed by Zubu-
lake’s potential recovery, which ranged from $1.27 million to $19.23 
million, depending on which party’s estimate was correct.173  Judge 
Scheindlin found, however, that the relative ability of each party to 
control costs in this case—a factor that invariably favored cost shifting 
in the Rowe decisions—was neutral because the sample did not allow 
Zubulake to reduce her already-targeted search list.174  Analyzing the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, Judge Scheindlin 
stated that employment discrimination litigation is not sufficiently im-
portant to tip the factor one way or another.  Lastly, as is typically the 
165 Id.  Judge Scheindlin suggested this factor might be triggered by “toxic tort 
class actions, environmental actions, so-called ‘impact’ or social reform litigation, cases 
involving criminal conduct, or cases implicating important legal or constitutional ques-
tions.”  Id. at 321. 
166 Id. at 323. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 323-24. 
169 Id. at 324. 
170 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
171 Id. at 284-91. 
172 Id. at 285-86. 
173 Id. at 287-88. 
174 Id. at 288. 
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case, Zubulake would benefit more from the production than the 
producing party would.175 
Interestingly, although only the last—and “least important”—
factor favored cost shifting, Judge Scheindlin ordered Zubulake to pay 
twenty-five percent of the remaining restoration costs.176  She reasoned 
that the factors cutting against cost shifting did so “only slightly” and 
that the plaintiff “[had] not been able to show that there [was] indis-
pensable evidence on those backup tapes.”177  Unlike previous cost-
shifting opinions, Judge Scheindlin’s decision explained what deter-
mined the amount shifted:  after beginning with the presumption that 
the responding party pays its own costs, the amount of cost shifting 
should correlate to the extent of speculation that the search would be 
successful, although the “analysis of [the test’s other] factors does in-
form the exercise of discretion.”178 
The “watershed” Zubulake decision quickly became regarded as 
the “most thorough treatment of cost-shifting under federal law.”179  
The test was applied without modifications in at least three cases,180 
modified slightly in two,181 and even used in some nonelectronic dis-
covery contexts.182  Zubulake was also successful in prompting more 
courts to use sampling in order to determine whether the plaintiff 
175 Id. at 289. 
176 Id. at 289 & n.75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
177 Id. at 289. 
178 Id. 
179 Mazza, supra note 68, ¶ 101, at 51. 
180 See Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03 
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (ordering a sampling of backup tapes prior to full analysis); OpenTV 
v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering fifty-percent cost 
shifting when factors four and seven favored cost shifting); Xpedior Creditor Trust v. 
Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(ordering the defendant to pay its own costs when it could benefit from the produc-
tion in other litigation). 
181 See Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying the Zu-
bulake analysis only to those inaccessible documents that the defendant should have 
reasonably foreseen would be discoverable prior to committing them to backup tapes, 
and shifting thirty percent of the costs); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 
568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (considering the importance of the requested discovery in 
resolving the issues of the litigation, in addition to the Zubulake factors). 
182 See Multitech. Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-0702, 2004 WL 1553480, at *1-2 
(N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (applying a modified six-factor Zubulake test for interrogatory 
answers). 
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met the marginal utility factors and whether the defendant credibly 
argued that the costs were too high.183 
This success did not come without some criticism.  Some com-
mentators critiqued the theoretical predominance of the first two fac-
tors, arguing that even a narrowly tailored request might be so expen-
sive as to dwarf the total amount of recovery, especially in employment 
litigation.184  Speaking five years after the Zubulake decision, Judge 
Francis remained “resistant to the hierarchy approach because [of] 
fear . . . that the factor at the top of the hierarchy will almost always 
wash out the other factors.”185 
But the concern that plaintiffs might overwhelmingly force expen-
sive restorations on defendants as long as they present some likelih-
ood of finding relevant files has not been borne out in practice.  In 
Zubulake itself, the plaintiff was ordered to reimburse 25% of UBS’s 
expenses despite the fact that 58.1% of the e-mails in the representa-
tive sample were relevant, including 68 e-mails that the plaintiff iden-
tified as “highly relevant.”186  Similarly, in another opinion applying 
the Zubulake test, OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies, the plaintiff was re-
quired to pay fifty percent of the costs although “the requested source 
code [was] highly likely to contain relevant information and [was] un-
available from another source.”187  In that case, the court transferred 
costs despite finding that only factors four (the similar resources of the 
parties)188 and seven (plaintiff’s greater benefit from data)189 weighed 
in favor of that move.  Although Judge Scheindlin warned that her test 
“cannot be mechanically applied at the risk of losing sight of its pur-
183 See, e.g., Hagemeyer, 222 F.R.D. at 603 (restricting protective orders to instances 
where sampling reveals that the request “truly threatens” to be an undue burden); Wi-
ginton, 229 F.R.D. at 569 (using sampling to determine the likelihood of finding incri-
minating e-mails and, thus, of determining the distribution of discovery costs). 
184 See Satterwhite & Quatrara, supra note 25, ¶ 14, at 6 (criticizing the Zubulake 
test in the employment litigation context). 
185 Francis, supra note 63, at 18. 
186 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see 
also id. (agreeing with the plaintiff that the e-mails were relevant in telling “a compel-
ling story of the dysfunctional atmosphere” at UBS but finding that none showed direct 
evidence of gender discrimination). 
187 219 F.R.D. 474, 478-79 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
188 See id. at 478 (noting that, unlike in Zubulake, the plaintiff was a large corpora-
tion able to fund costs). 
189 Although the court determined that the plaintiff would benefit more from the 
requested source code, it admitted that the code could also support the defendant’s 
noninfringement arguments.  Id. at 479. 
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pose,”190 startling results like OpenTV indicate that the Zubulake analysis 
did not bring predictability to the field. 
Other critics contended that Zubulake’s presumption against cost 
shifting in close calls would allow “the pendulum to swing too far in 
the opposite direction,” particularly in employment discrimination 
disputes.191  Practitioner Rodney Satterwhite warned that “[w]hen the 
majority of the factors deemed most important are inherently adverse 
to the employer, even assuming good-faith discovery practices on the 
part of the plaintiff, the potential impact on litigation is significant 
and dangerous.”192  Plaintiffs acting in bad faith, moreover, would 
once again be able to resort to weapons of mass discovery in their 
quest to force settlements. 
But the reported decisions in this Comment’s survey suggest that 
despite criticizing Rowe’s liberal cost shifting, the Zubulake test did not 
substantially decrease the practice.193  In fact, in all but one of the cas-
es applying Zubulake, some costs were shifted to the plaintiff.  The one 
outlier, Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., ad-
judicated by Judge Scheindlin, involved the unusual circumstance of a 
defendant who would benefit from the restoration of its documents in 
a related litigation.194  The primary difference between the Xpedior and 
Zubulake analyses was that both parties equally benefited from the res-
toration in Xpedior, while only the plaintiff did so in Zubulake.  This dif-
ference in the “least important factor” produced wildly divergent re-
sults:  imposing $41,488 out of a total $165,955 in expenses on 
individual plaintiff Laura Zubulake195 but protecting a corporate plain-
tiff from cost shifting of any portion of its demanded $400,000 discov-
ery.196  These opinions demonstrate the inherently fluid and imprecise 
application of any cost-shifting test, even by the tests’ creators. 
No decisions applying Zubulake in this Comment’s survey denied 
the requesting party’s discovery requests, even when there was a very 
190 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
191 Satterwhite & Quatrara, supra note 25, ¶ 19, at 9. 
192 Id. 
193 See cases discussed supra notes 180-82. 
194 See 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“This may be the rare case where 
both parties benefit from production.  Although Xpedior obviously benefits more . . . 
CSFB would have been required to restore many of the same systems in connection with 
its production obligations in [related litigation].  This factor therefore is neutral.”). 
195 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 283, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
196 Xpedior, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 466-67. 
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small likelihood that relevant data would be restored.197  Therefore, 
like the Rowe test, Zubulake did not reduce tremendous discovery costs; 
it merely redistributed them.  Its most enduring legacy did not be-
come apparent until 2006, when Rule 26(b)(2) created the two-tiered 
discovery system premised on accessible and inaccessible data. 
III.  RULE 26(B)(2) AND THE 2006 E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS 
The cost-shifting tests described in Part II helped to ascertain 
whether the responding party showed “good cause” under Rule 26(c) 
to obtain a protective order.  Several judges, including Judge Schein-
dlin, stated that “good cause” could also be shown by demonstrating 
that the plaintiff’s request ran “afoul of the Rule 26(b)(2) proportio-
nality test.”198  Through amendments in 2000 and 2006, Rule 26(b)(2) 
became increasingly important in guiding cost-shifting analyses and 
has arguably displaced the other tests.199  The following Section details 
Rule 26(b)(2)’s impact on cost-shifting analysis before and after the 
amendments and concludes that although the 2006 electronic discov-
ery amendments did not bring uniformity to the field of cost-shifting 
decisions, they helped decrease the practice of cost shifting. 
A.  Rule 26(b)(2) Prior to the 2006 Amendments 
The last major change to Rule 26 prior to the 2006 amendments 
occurred in 2000.  Faced with the prospect of rising discovery costs 
due to the explosion in e-discovery, the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules successfully proposed an amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), which 
had permitted discovery relevant to any “subject matter involved in 
197 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575, 577 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (compelling discovery with 75% of the costs shifted on plaintiff when sampling re-
vealed that the number of relevant e-mails would be “substantially lower than 4.5%”). 
198 Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 283; see also Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003) (stating that, in addition to the marginal utility, 
Rowe, and Zubulake tests, “it also can be argued with some force that the Rule 26(b)(2) 
balancing factors are all that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result when con-
sidering the scope of discovery of electronic records”). 
199 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000) (permitting judges to limit the frequen-
cy or extent of discovery by weighing the “burden or expense of the proposed discov-
ery [against] its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues”).  Follow-
ing the 2006 amendments, this proportionality test became a guide for evaluating 
whether parties showed “good cause” when requesting information that “is not reason-
ably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also 
infra Section III.B. 
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the [pending] action” only if the requesting party showed “good 
cause.”200  The Committee also added a sentence to Rule 26(b)(1) 
“calling attention to the limitations of subdivisions (b)(2)(i), (ii), and 
(iii) . . . to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision 
(b)(2) to control excessive discovery.”201  This cross-reference was 
needed because courts had “not implemented these limitations with 
the vigor that was contemplated.”202  Subdivision (b)(2)(iii) instructed 
judges to limit the frequency or extent of discovery by weighing the 
“burden or expense of the proposed discovery” against its “likely ben-
efit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in contro-
versy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolv-
ing the issues.”203 
The reminder to control excessive discovery worked in a way per-
haps unintended by the Advisory Committee.  Whereas few courts or-
dered cost shifting under Rule 26(b)(2) prior to 2000,204 the practice 
became more common following the adoption of the 2000 amend-
ments.205  Courts were particularly likely to order discovery and to shift 
costs for forensic recovery of deleted files from active hard-drive space 
for which the requesting party offered to pay.206  Some courts even came 
to expect the plaintiff to offer to pay for particularly burdensome dis-
covery.207  They did not, however, deny many more expensive discovery 
200 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amend-
ments; see also id. (“The good-cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to 
be flexible.”). 
201 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (“All discovery is subject to the limi-
tations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”). 
202 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amend-
ments. 
203 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000). 
204 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (finding only two decisions ordering 
e-discovery cost shifting prior to 2000, in both of which the requesting party offered to 
pay). 
205 See supra note 23 (finding that, in a survey of twenty-eight cases between 2000 
and 2006, courts ordered cost shifting on a requesting party at least eleven times, and 
on eight of these occasions the requesting party contested the order). 
206 See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 653-54 (D. 
Minn. 2002) (permitting the plaintiff to search the defendant’s computers for deleted 
files at the plaintiff’s own expense); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 
F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 
1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same). 
207 See, e.g., Cook v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 03-3926, 2005 WL 2429422, at 
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) (declining the plaintiff’s request for additional informa-
tion from the defendant’s accessible electronic personnel database because he did not 
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requests altogether, at least in the decisions identified in this Com-
ment’s survey.208  Instead, it appears some judges relied on cost shifting 
as a tool that allowed them to permit more discovery with less guilt.209 
B.  The 2006 Electronic Discovery Amendments 
The amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 that became ef-
fective on December 1, 2006, addressed electronic discovery.210  As the 
culmination of a decade-long Discovery Project by the Judicial Confe-
rence Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure,211 the amend-
ments sought to reduce the expense of e-discovery on producing par-
ties, offer enduring technology-neutral guidance to judges on ESI, and 
bring some measure of uniformity to disparate pockets of common law 
in many areas, including cost shifting.212  New Rule 26(b)(2) created a 
two-tiered system of discovery that made inaccessible data presumptively 
undiscoverable.213  The presumption could be overcome by a showing 
of “good cause.”214  “Good cause” analysis involved balancing seven fac-
tors listed in Rule 26(b)(2)’s advisory note—factors that courts also be-
gan applying to cost-shifting determinations.215 
provide sufficient evidence that the relevant files had not been previously produced, 
“nor [did] he volunteer[] to foot the bill for doing so”). 
208 This observation is limited to the cases in my survey, whose methodology is de-
scribed supra note 23.  Since the Westlaw search was intended to locate decisions dis-
cussing cost shifting, the search may have excluded many cases in which judges did in 
fact reject expensive discovery and did not even comment on possible cost shifting.  A 
comprehensive survey of all electronic discovery decisions would be necessary to iden-
tify such a trend. 
209 See supra Part II (describing courts’ willingness to order discovery in combination 
with cost shifting).  A notable exception to this trend is evident in Cognex Corp. v. Electro 
Scientific Indus., Inc., No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002).  The court 
denied discovery despite the plaintiff’s willingness to pay and warned that “[a]t some 
point, the adversary system needs to say ‘enough is enough’ and recognize that the costs 
of seeking every relevant piece of discovery is [sic] not reasonable.  This concept is reflect-
ed in Rule 26 itself and made express in the Comments thereto.”  Id. at *5. 
210 See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE RE-
PORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
22 (2005) (describing the proposed amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 and 
revisions to Form 35 as relating to “Discovery of Electronically Stored Information”). 
211 See generally Richard Marcus, Essay, Only Yesterday:  Reflections on Rulemaking Res-
ponses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004) (situating the e-discovery amend-
ments within the broader history of the discovery revolution). 
212 See Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery:  To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments 
Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 881-84 (2008). 
213 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
214 Id. 
215 See infra subsections III.B.2-.3. 
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1.  The Two-Tiered System 
Amended Rule 26(b)(2) borrowed heavily from Judge Schein-
dlin’s two-tiered discovery system, which made data production hinge 
on whether the data source was reasonably accessible.  Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) provides, “A party need not provide discovery of elec-
tronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as 
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”216  Rea-
sonably accessible relevant data fall in the first tier and must be pro-
duced.  If the producing party can demonstrate, however, that the da-
ta sought are not reasonably accessible, the data are presumptively 
undiscoverable.217  The burden then shifts to the requesting party to 
overcome that presumption by showing “good cause, considering the 
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”218 
New Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) replicates the old proportionality test 
from Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and limits discovery to circumstances in which 
the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 
and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.”219 
There is one key difference between the two-tiered systems in  
Zubulake and Rule 26(b)(2).  Zubulake conditioned the finding of 
“whether production of documents is unduly burdensome or expen-
sive . . . primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible 
format.”220  Judge Scheindlin described three types of accessible me-
dia:  (1) active, online data on hard drives, (2) near-line data that con-
sist of robotic storage devices that are quickly searchable, and (3) of-
fline storage and archives like a removable optical disk.221  Inaccessible 
data, in Judge Scheindlin’s view, consisted of sequential-access storage 
216 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
217 Although under the new Rule defendants could still incorrectly designate infor-
mation as inaccessible or deliberately convert it to inaccessible form, the amendment was 
deemed an improvement over prior practice (in which defendants simply ignored the 
discovery requests) by requiring the responding party to identify the sources of potential-
ly responsive information that it is not searching or producing because of cost.  See ADVI-
SORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULE AMENDMENTS OF SIG-
NIFICANT INTEREST 5 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/ 
Controversial_Report.pdf. 
218 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
219 Id. 26(b)(2)(C). 
220 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis 
omitted). 
221 Id. at 318-19. 
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devices that are not amenable to individual-document searches, like 
backup tapes, and erased, fragmented, or damaged data available for 
recovery on clusters of active space that have not been overwritten.222 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), on the other hand, provides that a “party need 
not provide discovery of electronically stored information from 
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost.”223  This formulation recognizes that a poor indi-
vidual defendant might still be unduly burdened even when she is 
called to restore information from active hard-drive space rather than 
more expensive backup tapes.  Rule 26(b)(2) and its advisory notes do 
not reference particular media that are more likely to present an un-
due expense.224  In fact, proposals to denote backup tapes as reasona-
bly inaccessible sources were rejected in order to keep the amend-
ments open to technological progress.225 
It is important not to overstate the difference between the Zubu-
lake formulation and the amended Federal Rules.  During interviews 
following the Zubulake case, Judge Scheindlin explained that her em-
phasis on media types was only meant to provide general guidelines as 
to what types of media typically present an undue burden, permitting 
exceptions.226 
Whether intended or not, however, the surface distinction be-
tween Zubulake and Rule 26(b)(2) has led to divergent treatment by 
the courts.  In W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, the court noted 
that although active servers are considered “accessible” under Judge 
Scheindlin’s approach, the restoration cost in that particular case 
made them “not reasonably accessible within the meaning of [Rule] 
26(b)(2)(B).”227  Other judges have adhered to Zubulake’s bright-line 
222 Id. at 319-20. 
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
224 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments (“It 
is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that may 
affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored information.”). 
225 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 50, at 32-34 (testimony of Joan Feldman, Computer 
Forensics, Inc.) (addressing concerns over identifying backup tapes as inherently inac-
cessible). 
226 See Ten Tips for Electronic Discovery:  A Special Interview with Judge Shira A. Schein-
dlin, ACC DOCKET, Jan. 2005, at 56, 70-72 (stating that her one oft-quoted and criti-
cized sentence from Zubulake, “[a] court should consider cost shifting only when elec-
tronic data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes,” should be read in 
context with other language in the opinion restating the broad Rule 26(b)(2) refer-
ences to “undue burden”). 
227 245 F.R.D. 38, 42-43 (D. Mass. 2007); see also id. (“In this case, the records 
sought by the Plaintiffs are stored on a server used by BeneFirst in Pembroke[,] Massa-
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definition of accessible and inaccessible documents even after the 
2006 amendments.  In Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. S.A.M., Inc., the court cited 
Rule 26(b)(2)’s “undue burden” language but proceeded to assert 
that “[m]achine-readable data, such as active, online, near-line, or of-
fline data in storage or archives are accessible; however, backup tapes 
and erased, fragmented, or damaged data is not accessible.”228  The 
court ordered the defendant to hire a forensic expert at the defen-
dant’s own expense because “the requested discovery is retained on a 
server, and therefore accessible.”229  No factual record was developed 
of the cost to hire such an expert and whether that cost would present 
an undue burden. 
Cost-shifting tests prior to the 2006 amendments sought to reduce 
discovery expenses by discouraging plaintiffs from making overbroad 
requests.230  As discussed in Part II, these efforts had little effect on 
wealthy plaintiffs.  Moreover, courts’ willingness to grant meritless dis-
covery in combination with cost shifting likely increased discovery costs 
altogether.231  By presumptively prohibiting the production of data 
from costly inaccessible sources, the two-tiered system created by Rule 
26(b)(2) lowered discovery costs rather than redistribute them.  For 
this reason, this Comment argues in Part IV that the optimal cost-
shifting analysis must take into account the new two-tiered system. 
2.  The Advisory Note to Rule 26(b)(2) 
Amended Rule 26(b)(2) instructs that data which are not reason-
ably accessible because of cost should not be produced absent a show-
ing of good cause.232  To help determine whether good cause exists, 
the rule’s advisory note introduces seven relevant factors: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; 
chusetts, which is clearly an accessible format.  However, because of BeneFirst’s me-
thod of storage and lack of an indexing system, it will be extremely costly to retrieve 
the requested data.”). 
228 No. 07-01201, 2008 WL 2522087, at *3 (E.D. La. June 20, 2008). 
229 Id. at *5. 
230 See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11-12 
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) (finding that cost shifting would provide plaintiffs with an “in-
centive to focus their requests”). 
231 For example, a responding party “protected” via cost shifting would still have to 
spend thousands of dollars on reviewing for privilege a production that, in the absence 
of cost shifting, may not have been ordered discoverable in the first place.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 144-46 (discussing the “Hobson’s choice” presented by the 
Rowe discovery protocol). 
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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(2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily ac-
cessed sources; 
(3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have 
existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; 
(4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that can-
not be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; 
(5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further in-
formation; 
(6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
(7) the parties’ resources.
233
 
The advisory note does not suggest any particular weighing of the new 
factors.  Though some practitioners viewed the factors as “almost 
identical” to the Zubulake standard,234 perhaps because of Judge 
Scheindlin’s presence on the Advisory Committee when this Rule was 
developed, a closer look at the factors tells a more nuanced story.  
Factors two, four, and six are nearly verbatim from Zubulake.  Factors 
one and seven borrow from Rowe.  Factor five, the importance and 
usefulness of the requested data, is imported from Wiginton v. CB Ri-
chard Ellis, Inc.235  Finally, factor three introduces a new, quasi-punitive 
measure favoring cost shifting when a responding party converts ac-
cessible data into inaccessible formats after discovery obligations arise.  
Although the advisory note significantly borrows from Rowe and Zubu-
lake, it does not replicate all of the previous tests’ factors.  Gone is the 
Rowe consideration of the purposes for which parties maintain data.  
The advisory note also does not reference two joint Rowe and Zubulake 
factors:  the relative ability of each party to control costs and the rela-
tive benefits to the parties of obtaining the information. 
The fact that Rule 26(b)(2) does not reference cost shifting, and 
that the seven factors in its advisory note are significantly different 
from the Rowe and Zubulake tests, raises a question:  are the seven 
“good cause” criteria in the advisory notes intended to guide cost-
shifting determinations?  The advisory note suggests that its factors are 
as applicable to cost shifting as they are to compelling discovery.  It 
233 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments. 
234 See, e.g., Daniel R. Murray et al., Taking a Byte Out of Discovery:  How the Properties 
of Electronically Stored Information Have Shaped E-Discovery Rules, 41 UCC L.J. 35, 47 n.17 
(2008). 
235 See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(adding formally “the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues of 
the litigation” to the Zubulake factors). 
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reminds judges that “the good-cause inquiry and consideration of the 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitations are coupled with the authority to set 
conditions for discovery. . . . The conditions may also include payment 
by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtain-
ing information from sources that are not reasonably accessible.”236  
The advisory note further instructs that “[a] requesting party’s wil-
lingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the court 
in determining whether there is good cause.  But the producing par-
ty’s burdens in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege 
may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.”237 
The advisory note’s reference to judges’ authority to set cost-
shifting conditions suggests that its factors may be applicable to cost-
shifting analysis.  On the other hand, it can be read as merely remind-
ing judges that this tool exists but leaving in place prior analytical 
frameworks like Rowe and Zubulake to guide cost shifting after the deci-
sion to order discovery is made.  This ambiguity has carried over in 
practice, with some courts applying the advisory-note factors only for 
the threshold inquiry of whether good cause is shown to order the 
production of inaccessible data, and others applying the factors to 
cost shifting as well.238 
3.  Trends from Practice 
Subject to the methodology and limitations of the survey described 
previously,239 the following trends are evident in cases decided after the 
2006 amendments.  Some courts expect the seven factors in the advi-
sory note to Rule 26(b)(2) to guide cost-shifting decisions exclusively.240  
236 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments. 
237 Id. 
238 See infra subsection III.B.3. 
239 See supra note 23.  It is important to qualify once again that the findings of this 
study are limited by the availability of cost-shifting decisions on the Westlaw service and 
by chosen searching methodologies.  Conclusions based on the roughly sixty-five cost-
shifting decisions identified in the survey may not necessarily be representative of the 
broad pool of all magistrate and district court opinions and orders.  Some qualitative 
and, to a lesser degree, quantitative trends can nonetheless be discerned from the de-
cisions on Westlaw. 
240 See, e.g., Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 247 F.R.D. 
567, 570-71 (D. Minn. 2007) (analyzing the seven factors and holding that the request-
ing party, who did not argue that documents were uniquely available from the respon-
dent’s database, did not show good cause in light of the undue burden presented by a 
$124,000 restoration cost); W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 41, 
44-45 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that when the plaintiffs reduced their original request 
and demonstrated that the requested data would be important and would not be avail-
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Thus, in at least one case, a district judge reversed a magistrate judge’s 
order that plaintiffs pay for restoring defendants’ data because it was 
not apparent from the record that the magistrate engaged in the Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) analysis of whether the requested information was not rea-
sonably accessible because of undue burden.241  Other courts focus on 
the proportionality test of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).242  They state that the 
proper analysis involves balancing “the likelihood that restored docu-
ments will prove relevant to the instant litigation with whether the cost 
of restoration places an undue burden on Defendant,” as provided in 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).243  These courts explicitly refer to the five pro-
portionality factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) as “cost-shifting” factors.244 
Others still separate “good cause” production analyses from cost-
shifting determinations.  In In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion, the plaintiff requested e-mails from backup tapes with production 
costing up to $124,000.245  The court applied the seven-factor test from 
the advisory note to Rule 26 to determine that plaintiff had met the 
good cause standard and ordered defendant to produce discovery.246  
It noted that it would conduct a cost-shifting analysis based on Zubu-
lake after the production, when the defendant itemized the costs in-
curred.247  And in Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers Casualty & Surety 
Company of America, Inc., the court ordered production at the respon-
dent’s expense but suggested that the parties negotiate cost shifting 
while reserving the court’s ability to apportion costs in the future by 
applying the Zubulake factors.248 
able from other sources, they presented sufficient “good cause” to order discovery cost-
ing $80,000 without reimbursement). 
241 See Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer Human Res. Consulting, 
Inc., No. 05-74326, 2007 WL 2080365, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 2007). 
242 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing the court to “limit the frequen-
cy or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the pro-
posed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in 
the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues”). 
243 See AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 443 (2007); see also id. at 
443-44 (ordering restoration of one-fourth of e-mail backup tapes for sampling at an 
estimated cost of $21,000 to $37,000, which the court considered small in comparison 
to the $30 million of claims at issue). 
244 Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638 (D. Kan. 2006); see also id. (con-
cluding that due to limited expense and the plaintiffs’ inability to pay, the backup tapes 
should be considered “reasonably accessible” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
245 No. 05-1695, 2007 WL 983987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at *2. 
248 No. 06-0078, 2007 WL 4165247, at *13-14 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007). 
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Other courts encouraged continual negotiation between parties to 
resolve discovery issues, providing voice to the 2006 amendments’ 
emphasis on mutual resolution of e-discovery issues in the Rule 26(f) 
conference.249  For example, as one court instructed, “To the extent 
that any Party requests data that is not readily accessible, the Par-
ties shall comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in deter-
mining whether the inaccessible data is to be produced and which 
Party will bear what portion of the costs of production, if any . . . .”250  
The court also ordered the parties to confer about inaccessible ESI 
prior to seeking judicial assistance.251 
Courts and parties have continued to be innovative in their cost-
shifting analyses.  In an employment lawsuit, Sterle v. Elizabeth Arden, 
Inc., the court entered a conditional cost-shifting order agreed upon 
by the parties.252  If the plaintiff uncovered any of seven specific sales-
performance reports in the defendants’ computer records, the defen-
dants would bear the costs of the inspection; otherwise the costs would 
shift to the plaintiff.253 
As more cases began to implicate individual litigants’ home com-
puters, which the requesting parties offered to search on their own 
dime, courts struggled over how to account for privacy in the Rule 
26(b)(2) analysis.254  At least one court ordered cost shifting based on 
broad concepts of fairness and equity as opposed to any formal ba-
lancing test or concerns about accessibility.  In Haka v. Lincoln County, 
the example in the Introduction to this Comment, the plaintiff re-
quested electronic documents from his former employer’s hard drive 
at a cost of approximately $49,000, not including attorney review 
time.255  The court appeared to accept the defendant’s estimate that 
the plaintiff’s potential recovery in the case would be “significantly 
less” than $100,000.256  Neither party could prove exactly what evi-
249 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (requiring parties to “discuss any issues about preserv-
ing discoverable information” at their initial conference). 
250 In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 26, 2007). 
251 Id. 
252 No. 06-01584, 2008 WL 961216, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2008). 
253 Id. 
254 See, e.g., Orrell v. Motorcarparts of Am., Inc., No. 06-0418, 2007 WL 4287750, at 
*7-8 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007) (authorizing the defendant to an employment discrimi-
nation suit to conduct a forensic examination of the plaintiff’s home computer at the 
defendant’s expense because the plaintiff had given inconsistent testimony about how 
she preserved files on her home computer). 
255 246 F.R.D. 577, 578 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
256 Id. at 578-79. 
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dence the hard drives would contain.  The court framed the question 
simply, “[I]s it worth it to spend tens of thousands of dollars to ex-
plore ESI that might reveal a smoking gun but is equally likely to re-
veal nothing much?”257  Without applying any formal balancing test, 
the judge stated that “fairness and efficiency” should require the par-
ties to split the costs evenly.258 
Haka demonstrates that even with more guidance from the Rules, 
cost shifting remains largely dependent on each judge’s discretion.  
Analytically, the result in Haka is hard to justify.  The discovery was from 
active hard-drive space that, at least under Zubulake, would be deemed 
accessible.  The court did not conclude that the $27,000 cost would be a 
particularly undue hardship for the defendant county.  The court or-
dered a plaintiff, whom it described as “a wage-earner with minimal re-
sources,” to pay at least $13,500 for discovery sought from accessible 
hard-drive space in a case where total recovery would likely be under 
$100,000.259  Although the plaintiff ultimately “swallowed hard” and 
proceeded with discovery, the decision was economically taxing.260 
It should not be very surprising that courts have not uniformly 
analyzed cost shifting, even in the wake of the 2006 amendments.  As 
discussed above, the new Rule 26(b)(2) and its advisory note do not 
explicitly state that its factors are applicable to cost shifting and 
should prevail over the Zubulake, Rowe, or marginal utility tests.  Even 
had the Rules Committee done so, magistrate judges who confront 
fact-intensive inquiries in an area lacking many published decisions 
would likely develop differing interpretations of Rule 26(b)(2).  This 
is in part because of the dearth of binding appellate decisions on the 
topic.  Very few courts of appeal address discovery decisions generally, 
and even fewer have the opportunity to provide meaningful guidance 
on cost shifting.261  Because discovery decisions are reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard,262 appellate courts typically defer to 
whatever formula was adopted by the lower court.263 
257 Id. at 579. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 578-79. 
260 Brian Formella, a partner at the law firm of Anderson, O’Brien, Bertz, Skrenes 
& Golla, which represented the plaintiff, graciously provided information on the plain-
tiff’s decision in a telephone interview on December 19, 2008. 
261 See Blakley, supra note 11, at 40 (praising the amended rules for providing 
guidance in an area where there is little appellate authority). 
262 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978). 
263 See, e.g., Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirm-
ing summarily the lower court’s order on cost shifting because “[t]he timing of the 
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Yet while the amended Rules have not brought uniformity, this 
Comment’s survey suggests that in the wake of their adoption, courts 
have become more skeptical of cost shifting.  They are more likely to 
shift costs only when the requesting party volunteers to bear them264 or 
when the request is made of nonparties.265  Judges also increasingly 
scrutinize the responding party’s attempts to use cost shifting as a 
shield.  Courts have refused to shift costs when defendants have failed 
to adequately inform the court about the precise difficulties and costs 
of restoring data,266 have precipitated the forensic issue in question by 
failing to preserve ESI,267 or have engaged in deceptive discovery tac-
tics.268  Cost shifting has become quite rare.  In fact, when those deci-
sions in which the requesting party did not offer to pay for discovery 
are excluded from the thirty-five cases addressing cost shifting post–
subpoenas, the wealth of materials sought—with the whiff of a fishing expedition ap-
parent—and the privileged nature of many of the documents provided a sound basis 
for the court to order reimbursement under [Rules 45(c) and 26(c)]”). 
264 See, e.g., Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 06-0016, 2007 WL 465680, at *3 
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007) (permitting the defendant company, which was sued for frau-
dulently enrolling the plaintiff in a cell-phone text-messaging subscription service, to im-
age the plaintiff’s home computer at the defendant’s cost to determine whether the 
plaintiff had ever heard of the defendant’s service or subscribed to it on the Internet). 
265 See Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 312-13 (N.D. Ind. 2007) 
(shifting the $7200 subpoena-compliance cost to the requesting party without formal 
analysis because the respondent was a nonparty). 
266 See Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. 07-0532, 2008 WL 
1805727, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008) (denying cost shifting because the defen-
dants had not informed the court about the number of backup tapes to be searched, 
the different methods the defendants use to store electronic information, the defen-
dants’ electronic-document-retention policies, the overlap in information between 
backup tapes and more accessible formats, and the extent to which the defendants had 
searched ESI that remained accessible); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99 (D. Md. 2003) (“[Defendant’s] failure to provide . . . informa-
tion needed to analyze the Rule 26(b)(2) cost-benefit factors . . . predictably, resulted 
in rulings that the Plaintiffs’ motions were meritorious.”). 
267 See Peskoff v. Faber, 251 F.R.D. 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2008) (“This is a problem of 
Mr. Faber’s own making and, consequently, the expense and burden of the forensic 
examination can hardly be described as ‘undue.’”); Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-
2488, 2007 WL 3231431, at *1, *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2007) (ordering the plaintiff in a 
discrimination suit who deleted relevant e-mails from her computer to make the com-
puter available for restoration). 
268 See, e.g., Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 239 F.R.D. 376, 387 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(“Defendants now assert that compliance with this Court’s orders will cost them mil-
lions of dollars and take months to complete.  Although the cost of compliance is in-
deed high, Defendants have litigated this case without regard to cost when it has been 
in their interest to do so.  The cost Defendants must now incur is a direct result of non-
compliant and deceptive discovery tactics and disregard of court orders throughout 
the course of discovery.”). 
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December 1, 2006, only one contested cost-shifting order remains:  
Haka v. Lincoln County. 
Provided that additional surveys support the conclusion that cost-
shifting orders have decreased, the next question is why?  There are 
too few cases in the sample to discern the reason for the decrease, but 
it is reasonable to posit two grounds.  First, Rule 26(b)(2)’s presump-
tion against discovery of reasonably inaccessible data might have 
knocked out some marginal “compromise cases” when in the past 
judges ordered discovery accompanied by cost shifting.  Second, par-
ties may have become more effective in negotiating electronic discov-
ery issues without judicial intervention.  This result is specifically en-
couraged by new Rule 26(f), which requires parties to “discuss any 
issues about preserving discoverable information” at their initial con-
ference.269  In some cases, courts explicitly ordered parties to negotiate 
cost shifting, pointing them to various factors in Zubulake and Rule 
26(b)(2).270  In others, the parties likely reached mutual understand-
ings about electronic discovery in their Rule 26(f) conference. 
Thus, while district courts have not uniformly interpreted the elec-
tronic discovery amendments, the amendments appear to have swung 
the pendulum back from the liberalized cost shifting previously prac-
ticed by courts employing the marginal utility, Rowe, and Zubulake tests. 
IV.  REACHING EQUILIBRIUM:  WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL  
COST-SHIFTING PARADIGM? 
Bright-line approaches to cost shifting have not gained significant 
traction, despite their potential advantages in promoting uniformity, 
predictability, and administrability.  As has been clear since the late 
1990s, letting corporate defendants bear their electronic discovery 
expenses as a cost of doing business271 ignores the ubiquitous nature 
of computers in our society.  In laying out his rationale for the mar-
ginal utility test,272 Magistrate Judge Facciola ridiculed the “cost of 
doing business” argument: 
It is impossible to walk ten feet into the office of a private business or gov-
ernment agency without seeing a network computer, which is on a server, 
269 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
270 See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text. 
271 A primary example of this practice is presented in In re Brand Name Prescription 
Drugs Antitrust Litigation. See No. 94-0897, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 
1995) (holding that the defendant should pay the cost of electronic discovery because 
the defendant chose the very electronic storage method that made it so costly). 
272 See supra Section II.A. 
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which, in turn, is being backed up on tape (or some other media) on a 
daily, weekly or monthly basis.  What alternative is there?  Quill pens?
273
 
With corporations universally backing up their files thanks to 
cheap storage, the underlying assumption that parties only save par-
ticularly useful records has broken down.274  The absence of any kind 
of cost shifting would encourage requesting parties to begin discovery 
with overbroad and highly costly document requests, both as a strateg-
ic method to coerce settlements and, less calculatingly, to uncover as 
much information as possible regardless of the cost.275 
As the Rowe, Zubulake, and Rule 26(b)(2) tests illustrate, courts 
have come a long way from considering bright-line approaches to cost 
shifting.  The question today is not whether costs should ever be 
shared, but rather how often.  Some commentators argue that expan-
sive cost shifting is a necessary solution to rising e-discovery costs.  
Commentators Martin Redish and Marnie Pulver both advocate for 
presumptive cost-shifting models for inaccessible data.276  They cor-
rectly argue that such a model would incentivize requesting parties to 
tailor their discovery to the most pertinent documents and minimize 
costs.  In 2004, the Sedona Conference Institute recommended that 
“[i]f the data or formatting of the information sought is not reasona-
bly available to the responding party in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, then, absent special circumstances, the costs of retrieving and re-
viewing such electronic information should be shifted to the 
requesting party.”277  Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 went one 
273 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001). 
274 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Information is retained not because it is expected to be used, but 
because there is no compelling reason to discard it.”). 
275 See McPeek, 202 F.R.D at 33-34 (“American lawyers engaged in discovery have 
never been accused of asking for too little.  To the contrary, like the Rolling Stones, 
they hope that if they ask for what they want, they will get what they need.  They hardly 
need any more encouragement to demand as much as they can from their opponent.”). 
276 See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 
561, 569-70 (2001) (proposing that the requesting party could overcome the presump-
tion by showing an inability to pay costs); Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Dis-
covery:  The Economic Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1410 (2000) (ar-
guing that forcing the requesting party to internalize discovery costs would “trim 
abusive discovery requests”).  Since these proposals came years prior to the 2006 e-
discovery amendments, it is not clear whether the authors would advocate for pre-
sumptive cost shifting in addition to or in place of presumptive nondiscovery of inaccess-
ible data per Rule 26(b)(2)(B). 
277 SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCU-
MENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 44 
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step further, mandating cost shifting if the responding party “can-
not—through reasonable efforts—retrieve the data or information re-
quested or produce it in the form requested.”278  In 2006, some practi-
tioners urged the Advisory Committee to adopt this standard in order 
to disincentivize abusive plaintiffs.279  Judge Francis further pointed 
out that liberalized cost shifting provides a welcome compromise for 
judges needing to make discovery determinations under information-
al uncertainty.280  The plaintiff, in turn, can add credibility to her ef-
fort to locate the smoking-gun e-mail by taking financial responsibility 
for the search. 
Despite these appealing considerations, cost shifting should rarely 
be granted.  In addition to being antithetical to the traditional rule 
that parties bear their own costs,281 a presumptive cost-shifting rule 
would not reduce the entire burden on producing parties, who would 
still have to search and review restored data for privilege.282  In fact, if 
a presumptive cost-shifting model encouraged judges to grant discov-
ery in cases where they otherwise would not, the burden on the de-
fendant to review scores of restored documents could outweigh the 
savings from the technical restoration.  It would also undermine the 
efforts of the amended Rules to limit the overall cost of discovery. 
A pay-per-view approach would additionally disincentivize some 
corporate defendants from innovating and maintaining cost-efficient 
storage, hoping instead that the high costs of backup restoration 
would thwart plaintiffs’ requests.  More fundamentally, the traditional 
presumption that parties pay their costs is meant to protect plaintiffs 
with meritorious claims from being priced out of the discovery system.  
Individual plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits, making up a 
(2004), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/Sedona 
Principles200401.pdf (italics omitted).  These recommendations were made in 2004, 
when cost shifting was arguably at its peak. 
278 TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (1999). 
279 See, e.g., Letter of John H. Martin, Thompson & Knight LLP, to Peter G. 
McCabe, Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules & Practice & Procedure, Admin. Office of the 
U.S. Courts ( Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/ 
04-CV-055.pdf (“The rules for electronic discovery should be fair to both plaintiffs and 
defendants, and should address the significant and burdensome costs that arise when 
the rules are manipulated by an abusive litigant.”). 
280 See Francis, supra note 63, at 19. 
281 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“Under 
[discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense 
of complying with discovery requests . . . .”). 
282 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (describing the costs to 
a government agency of diverting its employees to conduct the searches). 
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large portion of cost-shifting cases, typically are far poorer than the 
corporate defendants; liberalized cost shifting would exacerbate this 
disadvantage.283  If the cost-shifting presumption could be overcome 
by a plaintiff’s lack of resources, as recommended by Redish,284 then 
the adjudication of that question would involve many of the same ad-
ministrative costs as multifactor tests. 
The “reasonable efforts” Texas Rule, depending on how it is in-
terpreted by individual judges, could shift costs for all but the most 
basic e-mail searches on hard drives.  The Sedona Proposal would 
shield from discovery nearly all archival systems that are not accessed 
by the employer on a “regular basis,” regardless of accessibility and 
cost, which is a vague standard that likely goes too far in preventing 
meritorious discovery.  It would also encourage employers to quickly 
move data from online systems to storage tapes in order to attempt to 
protect it from discovery. 
Judge Francis is correct that there are situations in which a 
nuanced cost-shifting decision is a better result than prohibiting dis-
covery altogether or sticking the defendant with the entire bill.  There 
is a danger, however, that courts might overuse the tool and order dis-
covery with cost shifting in situations where the factual record is not 
well developed, as Judge Scheindlin observed had been occurring in 
practice,285 or where the discovery truly represents a costly fishing ex-
pedition, regardless of who pays.  Without conducting interviews of 
judges who order cost shifting, it is impossible to say with certainty how 
those judges would rule if cost shifting were unavailable.  There is good 
reason to believe that, in at least some cases, the ability to transfer costs 
led to ordering discovery that would otherwise have been denied.286  In 
this sense, while cost shifting may at first glance appear to be an anti-
plaintiff measure, in practice it may actually be harming defendants, 
283 See sources cited supra note 24. 
284 See Redish, supra note 276, at 608-18 (discussing the suggestion that courts use a 
“conditional cost-shifting” analysis in allocating discovery costs). 
285 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
286 Judge Francis has voiced this concern:  
Let me tell you why I think you can’t know at the outset whether the cost shift-
ing is favorable to the producing party or favorable to the requesting party.  
That is because you can’t know what the judge would have done in the ab-
sence of the ability to shift costs.  If the judge simply would have denied the 
discovery, then the availability of cost shifting is favorable to the requesting 
party, because at least now it is in a position to get its hands on it. 
Francis, supra note 63, at 18. 
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who are forced to open up their storage systems and incur the costs of 
reviewing thousands of documents for privilege prior to production.287 
Finally, granting access to the respondent’s computer systems at 
the plaintiff’s own cost—the electronic equivalent of open warehouse 
discovery—would not be a viable solution.  Unlike paper filing systems 
that maintain some segregation for confidential files, opening res-
ponding parties’ computer systems “would compromise legally recog-
nized privileges, trade secrets, and often the personal privacy of em-
ployees and customers.”288  As described in subsection II.B.2, cost 
shifting has also brought a plaintiff-friendly discovery protocol.  In 
Rowe and Murphy, plaintiffs were given all of the defendant’s files, re-
viewed them, and then provided those they considered relevant back to 
the respondents.  Though this protocol has become less common in re-
cent cases, it represents a significant danger to defendants’ privacy 
and confidentiality. 
In several of the cases discussed above, a party obtained access to 
another party’s storage systems by offering to pay for access.289  Though 
a plaintiff’s willingness to pay resolves the defendant’s financial bur-
den (particularly when the defendant is reimbursed for its attorney 
review time), courts should still scrutinize whether discovery is neces-
sary in such cases.  Wealthier plaintiffs should not get substantially 
broader access to discovery than poorer ones.  The advisory note to 
Rule 26(b)(2), however, encourages this result:  “A requesting party’s 
willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the 
court in determining whether there is good cause.  But the producing 
party’s burdens in reviewing the information for relevance and privi-
lege may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.”290 
It is important to recognize that the problem of electronic discov-
ery is not just that it is expensive.  Part of the problem is that it is also 
ubiquitous.  Companies and individuals alike now maintain nearly all 
of their sensitive and confidential information electronically, includ-
ing medical records, financial records, correspondence with attorneys, 
287 See supra notes 144-46, 231, and accompanying text. 
288 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446, at 80 (2007); see also 
AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444 n.19 (2007) (“The Court con-
cludes that granting Plaintiff access to hard drives would be unworkable given the ina-
bility of Defendant to protect privileged documents.”).  But see Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting the plain-
tiff access to the defendant’s computer systems and select documents the plaintiff be-
lieved would be relevant). 
289 See sources cited supra note 23. 
290 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments. 
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personal diaries, and family photographs.  In the pre-ESI era, it would 
have been difficult to imagine a court ordering any attorney to rum-
mage through a defendant’s personal home, but now, virtual invasions 
of defendants’ personal computers are increasingly common.291  When 
one party’s willingness to pay opens a treasure trove of potentially 
confidential, personal, and irrelevant information, the “protected” 
respondent is still damaged. 
In Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., District Judge Re-
ginald Lindsay acknowledged that the plaintiff’s willingness to pay for 
discovery made the production question a “close call.”292  Judge Lind-
say nevertheless denied the request, noting that the defendant, who 
had already conducted an extensive search for relevant documents, 
did not consciously delete documents from active space, making it un-
likely that they would only be preserved on backup tapes.293  Judge 
Lindsay appeared disturbed with the prospect of permitting discovery 
based largely on the plaintiff’s ability to pay: 
There is something inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one 
party to obtain a heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay 
for it.  There are limits on the number of depositions and interrogatories 
even though more might well produce relevant information.  There is 
no exception to those limitations based upon one party’s willingness to 
pay.  The sense of fairness underpinning our system of justice will not be 
enhanced by the courts participating in giving strategic advantage to 
those with deeper pockets.294 
Expressing his frustration with the system in practice, Judge Lindsay 
wrote, “At some point, the adversary system needs to say ‘enough is 
enough’ and recognize that the costs of seeking every relevant piece of 
discovery is not reasonable.”295  To the extent that the two-tiered system 
allows limited discovery of inaccessible information regardless of the 
requesting party’s willingness to pay for the restoration, the 2006 
amendments may represent the turning point Judge Lindsay advocated. 
291 See, e.g., Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 31, 2007) (authorizing review of a former employee’s personal computers); Frees, 
Inc. v. McMillian, No. 05-1979, 2007 WL 184889, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2007) (same); 
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 06-0524, 2006 WL 3825291, at *3, 5-6 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (permitting the imaging and review of a former employee’s home 
computer upon an allegation by the former employer that the defendant stored the 
company’s proprietary information on the home computer). 
292 No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *4 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002). 
293 Id. at *5. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
1572 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1523 
Courts should not shy away from denying expensive production of 
barely relevant discovery from storage.  The advisory note to Rule 
26(b)(2) effectively incorporates the marginal utility test from McPeek 
v. Ashcroft by including as a relevant factor “the likelihood of finding 
relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, 
more easily accessed sources.”296  This factor should be paramount in 
the threshold inquiry of whether any discovery at all is appropriate, 
before moving to the question of cost shifting.  By way of example, in 
McPeek, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for additional sam-
pling of three out of four backup tapes, noting that although “[t]here 
is a theoretical possibility that such data exists on backup tapes,” the 
court “reject[s] the notion that the mere possibility that data exists 
justifies forcing the government to search backup tapes irrespective of 
the cost.”297  The production decision also hinged on marginal utility 
in In re General Instrument Corporate Securities Litigation, where after ob-
taining 110,000 pages of discovery and initially indicating satisfaction 
with the disclosures, the plaintiff requested additional e-mails from 
backup tapes.298  The court denied the production, even though the 
technical costs were not unduly expensive, because the limited value 
from the additional documents was outweighed by the defendants’ re-
view costs.299 
The Medtronic case described in subsection II.B.1 should serve as a 
warning to courts enamored with cost shifting.300  There, the court per-
mitted the plaintiff to discover a set of older backup tapes unlikely to 
contain relevant e-mails so long as the plaintiff paid one hundred per-
cent of the recovery, relevance-review, and privilege-review costs.301  But 
if those tapes were so marginally relevant that they justified reimburse-
ment of restoration and full attorney-review costs, then they should not 
have been produced at all.  Under the new Rule 26(b)(2)(B) frame-
work, the court should simply conclude that the plaintiff has not shown 
appropriate “good cause” to warrant discovery.302 
Taken together, the above concerns point to an optimal paradigm 
in which costly discovery should be ordered only when it passes the 
296 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments. 
297 212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003). 
298 See No. 96-1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999). 
299 Id. 
300 See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553-58 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003); see also supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text. 
301 229 F.R.D. at 562. 
302 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
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marginal utility test, with cost shifting reserved for exceptionally close 
calls.  Recall that marginal utility weighs the benefit of discovering re-
levant evidence against the costs to all the parties.  Cost shifting does 
not alter the sum of the expenses for the litigation as a whole; it mere-
ly redistributes it between the parties.  It can, however, help reduce 
uncertainty in cases in which the likelihood of success is speculative by 
encouraging the requesting party to conduct the cheapest and most 
effective search.  In an ideal scenario, this would reduce costs substan-
tially enough that the discovery passes the marginal utility test. 
So which analytical framework would be the most effective in this 
system?  As described above, the problem with the Rowe and Zubulake 
tests in practice was that by making cost shifting their primary consid-
eration, they generally took it as a given that discovery would be or-
dered in the first place.303  The “compromise” of ordering discovery 
plus reimbursement led to a liberalized cost-shifting paradigm in 
which parties were producing marginally relevant information at great 
expense.  Conversely, the problem with the two-tiered discovery sys-
tem in Rule 26(b)(2) and the seven factors in the advisory note is that 
they focus primarily on permitting or prohibiting discovery and do 
not speak to the cost-shifting analysis.  Understanding the flaws of the 
judicial tests and Rule 26(b)(2) leads one to a natural two-step solu-
tion that emphasizes the strengths of each method. 
A court should first decide whether discovery is appropriate and 
only then consider cost shifting.  This approach would begin by ana-
lyzing under Rule 26(b)(2) and its advisory note whether the informa-
tion sought is not reasonably accessible because it creates an undue 
burden and, if so, whether the requesting party demonstrated good 
cause for why the discovery is appropriate.  The marginal utility of un-
covering additional information should be the key factor courts use in 
this determination.  Sampling will provide critical, nonspeculative es-
timates of both the ultimate expense and the likelihood of finding 
important documents. 
After the good cause inquiry is completed, in most circumstances 
courts should not have to resort to a cost-shifting analysis.  Either the 
discovery is ordered or it is not.  But when the marginal utility inquiry 
is a particularly close call, courts can consider shifting costs in order to 
incentivize the most cost-efficient production.  When properly ap-
plied, the Zubulake test, which places the most weight on marginal util-
303 See, e.g., supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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ity factors but also considers the economic resources of the parties 
and the total cost of the production, is best suited for this analysis.304 
CONCLUSION 
The rise and fall in cost shifting over the last decade is perhaps 
best explained as a judicial knee-jerk reaction to the explosion in elec-
tronic discovery expenses.  At its height, the cost-shifting paradigm 
and plaintiff-friendly cost-shifting protocol undermined three goals of 
the judicial system:  efficient administration of justice (including pro-
tections against overbroad discovery), uniformity, and fair access to 
the discovery process regardless of a party’s wealth.  Although the 
2006 electronic discovery amendments have not brought much un-
iformity to cost shifting, they appear to have restricted cost shifting to 
more appropriate cases.  Forcing a requesting party to pay for the res-
ponding party’s expenses should be considered an extraordinary re-
medy employed only after sampling, when the requesting party de-
monstrates a real, nonspeculative likelihood that the discovery would 
lead to relevant evidence but the cost is prohibitive.  The puzzling Ha-
ka decision from this Comment’s Introduction stands as an outlier in 
the postamendment milieu; one can only hope that it remains so. 
 
304 See supra Section II.C. 
